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1CHAPTER I
ROOTS OF THE MODERN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY
Scholastic research has, in large part, ignored the role which gathering,
recruiting and retaining an anny played in Chinese society. Yet, in many ways this
scholastic gap simply mirrors the Confucian conception of soldiers. Traditional
Confucian society did much to devalue the societal and economic prestige of this
class. As a Chinese proverb explains, 'Good iron is not used for making nails as good
men are not used for making soldiers.' 1. In the classic vertical ranking of society,
joining the military was considered the least of choices. "Traditionally, the Chinese
divided the people into five social classes, according to social importance: scholars,
fanners, artisans, merchants and soldiers."2 Society ordered itself around the scholar-
officials serving government positions. Such positions provided officials with social
status and a steady income that could lead to increased family standing. After
winning an official administrative position through success in the imperial exam
system, markers or placards were placed outside households of winners, conveying
the greatness of this accomplishment to the public. The collective household (jiating
Jff<JJl) was then marked as special within greater Confucian society. Thus, "The most
David A. Graff and Robert Higham, A Military History ofChina (Westview Press, 2002), 26.
2 Graff 2002, p. 148.
2prestigious career in Qing society was that of the scholar-officialY
Yet, like many complex and long lasting societal phenomena, the career
of a scholar-official was not without its complications. For all the tangible societal
and economic gains two, sometimes conflicting Confucian forces served to dissuade
potential scholars. While the central family was recognized in the scholastic
ceremony, official positions often required capable males to leave their families for
extended periods of time as different, obligatory, postings around the Empire arose.
Thus, the scholar-official was sometimes placed in a position of choosing between
loyalty to the greater nation (zhong ,~ ) and filial piety (xiao 1t). This condition,
combined with a perception of the corrupting nature of greater politics, was noted in
popular literature during the Ming and Qing dynasties, while contemporary
examinations of Confucian society note the discomfort, fear and even potential
danger of such posts. "Certainly more than one man must have wondered whether the
prestige or promise of broader power and influence was worth leaving familiar
surroundings and even a life of ease - or worse, risking life and limb."s These
complexities between loyalty and filial piety in even the highest of social rankings
help highlight the extreme undesirability ofmilitary service. Soldiering combined all
the least appealing aspects of Confucian society, provided no recognition for the
household (jiating *~), little money, unequaled personal danger and, by nature, the
3 This development of this scholar-official class had begun in the Song dynasty (960-1279)
4 Susan Naquin and Evelyn S. Rawski, Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century (Yale University
Press, 1987), 123.
5 Miranda Brown, The Politics ofMourning in Early China (SUNY Press, 2007), 84.
3removal of a coveted strong young male from the household.
Indeed, the degradation of Chinese soldiers as backwards, somewhat
foolish persons is long lasting as seen in this cartoon from the 1980'S.6
Comrade, rhis is oiijar.
Running water is in kitchen.
s!ll±Jt*.*fi: Returning soldier .f.-=- ~
This cartoon depicts the returning PLA youth engaging in village choirs, yet the
young soldier is ignorant of the changes occurring in 1980's China. The depiction of
him unaware of running water, illustrates a simple message. Even in the latter period
of Chinese history, soldiers have been faced with social stigmas that regard them as
uneducated, naive and ignorant. Thus, for various and persistent factors, the
mobilization of soldiers faced overcoming Chinese societal norms as well as
generalized civilian animosity. This has been true throughout both dynastic and
contemporary China.
Beyond societal and Confucian norms that lowered the prestige and
social acceptance given soldiers, tangible Chinese history itself worked strongly
against popular support of armies. Beginning in the waning decades of the Han
6 C. E. Bled, Understanding China through cartoons (Society for a Better Understanding of China, 1985), 45.
4dynasty (206 BCE-220 AD) Chinese rulers faced with economic decline, continuous
invasions and an overburdened populace began enlisting criminals and foreign
mercenaries into the army. "Han Emperors maintained a large army of more than one
million men. The conscription system however, did not meet the extraordinary
demands of frequent wars ... The later Han emperors began to include criminals and
mercenaries in the army."? Not surprisingly, the new armies did not always act in the
best interests of the commoners. Looting, destruction of property and various crimes
became commonplace among many units ofthe new armies. The collapse of the Han
dynasty followed soon after these military measures. Successive dynasties,
throughout Chinese history, were faced with declining states and often followed this
same model. As they began enlisting anyone who would join the army, destruction,
loss of life and general chaos often followed. Thus, criminals and foreign
mercenaries pressed into a makeshift national defense force not only directly
threatened the welfare of the common people, but became a sign of failing rule and
chaos between dynasties.
Indeed, the drive to create new kinds of armies continued until the very
end of dynastic Chinese history. In the 1800's as the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) found
itself increasingly unable to defend its ports, trade centers and cities from foreign
incursion, many inside and outside the government began pushing for military
modernizations. Eventually such reforms did take place. Beginning in the late 1860's,
China began a vigorous campaign to incorporate Western technology and weapons
7 Li, Xiaobing, A History ofthe Modern Chinese Army (The University of Kentucky Press, 2007),
18.
into the dynastic armies. After modernization began these reforms received
substantial attention, and real progress in strengthening the army did occur. "By the
tum of the century [1900], China's New Army was a far more effective force [than
old dynastic armies]."8
While attention, time and money poured into creating a new army
equipped with Western weapons, old customs hindered the scope ofpotential
reforms. "Unfortunately, the New Army could not save the empire because the
Manchu rulers refused to carry the reforms beyond weapomy."9 The Emperors were
unwilling to change dynastic regulations that governed the military. Many centuries
of rule had created an elaborate system that helped insulate the political center from
the military, sheltered the Emperor from coups and protected political reputation
from military failure. Amid such concerns the political center forbade substantive
changes in the military chain of command, training or ideology. Unfortunately,
modern weapons and battle tactics were incompatible with regulations that had been
established when far different technologies dominated the battlefield. Compounding
China's problems, corruption, mismanagement and embezzlement in the new forces
further plagued modernization. These inadequacies, combined with a number of
problems faced by a declining state, doomed the new forces to ultimate military
failure. As China's new military lost battle after battle to foreign enemies, the new
recruits' morale became substantially affected. "...The early recruits were soon
disillusioned by the government's corruption, mismanagement, and worst of all, its
8 Xiaobing 2007, p. 38.
9 Xiaobing 2007, p. 38.
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6failure against European, American and Japanese forces ... "10
Thus, with the ultimate fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911 China was faced
with new, militarily modernized and numerically substantial armies that had become
disillusioned with the old empire. As central authority crumbled regional leaders who
could command direct loyalty and control over various units began carving up pieces
of China. This marked the beginning of warlordism in China. "Warlordism arose as a
consequence of a militarization ofpolitics that accompanied the fall of China's last
imperial dynasty."ll As regional commanders maneuvered for position and power,
life in these new micro-kingdoms became progressively crushing and oppressive for
average citizens. "The conditions of warlordism had a devastating effect on the lives
of the Chinese people ... The people were burdened with new taxes and loans raised
by warlord rulers to support their growing armies, while funding for education and
other public services was drastically reduced."12 Adding to these burdens, the new
armies, often owing little geographic, political or cultural loyalty to their current
position, became notoriously cruel to the locals. "The provincial armies were ...
notoriously corrupt, and feared by the local peasantry."13 In the wake of such
hardship and destruction, the warlord period, lasting from 1912 until 1927, became a
particularly dark chapter in Chinese history.
Eventually, the combined forces of the Goumindong and the newly
10 Xiaobing 2007, p. 27.
11 Graff2002,p.175.
12 Graff 2002, p. 189.
13 John Gittings, The Role a/the Chinese Army (OUP for RIIA, 1966),50.
7formed Chinese Communist Party (CCP) put an end to the warlord era in the 1926-
1927 Northern Expedition. However, the problems of war and armies in China only
grew worse. Beginning with the 1937 Japanese invasion, China entered yet another
period of endemic warfare. For a full eight years China was caught in a power
struggle between the Empire of Japan, the Guomindong and the CCP. In the course
of these eight years "...Over 100 million homeless refugees (almost a quarter of the
population) fled to to the interior [primarily from coastal cities] Over 20 million
civilians lost their lives. Families were tom apart. Countless widows were left to fend
for themselves... countless husbands and brothers were forcibly pressed into service.
Many died on the battlefield, others succumbed to wounds left untreated, and yet
others to starvation and diseases.'* Following the defeat of the Japanese Empire in
1945 the Guomindong and CCP continued to battle over control of China for four
more years. Thus, China found itself in nearly forty years of warfare. It is hard to
overestimate the sheer destruction, loss of life and trauma this left on the country and
its people. "With such losses came a brutalization process that touched the entire
population and left long lasting scars."IS
It was during this period of chaos and destruction that the CCP came into
existence. Founded in 1921, amid endemic warfare, the communists came to the
decided realization that without a strong military branch of their own they would not
survive the turbulent times. Thus, on August 1, 1927, the People's Liberation Army
(PLA) was officially born. As one more political and military party vying for support,
14 Graff 2002, p. 224.
15 Graff 2002, p. 224.
8the Communists made the wise realpolitik decision to gain popular support for the
PLA by becoming the likable military faction. "To achieve success in a military
era .,. the Communist Party ultimately had to find a way to accommodate military
power within their political structureI6." In its early years the PLA contained large
numbers of ex-warlord soldiers, peasant militiamen, fresh recruits, bandits and even
fugitives. I? In order to resolve the apparent paradox between orderly civil, likable
behavior and the amalgamation of the disparate and often uncivil available soldiering
base, the PLA began implementing a series of top-down decrees designed to gamer
popular support - the most famous being the 'Three Rules and Eight Injunctions'
delivered by Mao Zedong in 1928 that became the PLA's 'disciplinary catechism',
which survived, with a few minor changes, to the civil war's end and official Chinese
unification in 1949.18 Rules such as "Take not even a needle or thread from the
people," "Replace all doors and return all straw on which you sleep before leaving a
house," "Speak courteously to the people, "Help them whenever possible" and "Pay
for everything damaged," are often extremely specific in detailing behavior designed,
and required, to increase the newly formed PLA's reputation among the people. 19
Not only did such regulations fit well with the general precepts of
communism, but they legitimately served to greatly increase the PLA's civilian-
military reputation. "Adherence to these commandments would make the Red Army
16 Graff 2002, p. 190.
17 Gittings 1966, p. 103.
18 Gittings 1966, p. 103.
19 Graff 2002, p. 235.
9markedly different from the existing Chinese armies, particularly the predatory
warlord armies... The comparatively good behavior of the Red Army in part explains
how Communist soldiers won the "hearts and minds" of the Chinese people. "20 In
many ways the early formation of the PLA became dependent on establishing a party
that could overcome the chaos sweeping the country. The early PLA became more
than a military faction, it became a amalgamation of people with the ability and
doctrine to secure order and peace to the nation. Amid the warfare an army was
needed, but the PLA took great pains in distinguishing itself from the other forces
that ravaged the land. Thus, securing recruitment, gaining acceptance and eventual
national domination was, in large part, accomplished by the PLA becoming a
civilizing force in an era of extreme destruction.
Such practices worked extremely well during wartime. Yet, as successful
as these policies had been in generating popular support, they were largely limited to
the period of civil war. In 1950, hardly one year after unification, war broke out on
the Korean peninsula. China, aiding the North Korean invasion of the south, was
faced with an entirely new recruitment dynamic. While the PLA leadership relied
heavily upon the experiences gained during the civil war, a multitude of new factors
existed that made mobilization for this conflict of paramount importance and
fundamentally different from past conflicts. For the first time in the PLA's then 22-
year-old history mobilization was required without direct threat to, or war on,
Chinese soil. Yet, the strategic importance of Korea was long known and respected.
"The Korean Peninsula borders on Manchuria, the homeland of the Qing Dynasty
20 Graff 2002, p. 236.
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and, in later years the most industrial part of China.,,21 Such security concerns had
driven the Qing dynasty to war, and subsequent embarrassing defeat, in the 1894-5
with Japan. Furthermore China, while unified, was hardly completely politically
stable.
The Korean war imposed a heavy burden on the Chinese
Government, already faced with the task of winning the
support of a population of which more than three-
quarters had only come under communist control in the
past three to four years. The combination of continued
internal unrest with a major external war meant that the
need to secure mass support was all the more urgent,
since the alternative would be doubly disastrous. 22
Beyond the importance ofKorea and the conflict itself, various political and
international factors contributed heavily to the complexities of the time. For one,
China, politically, could not declare war on the United States, much less the newly
formed United Nations, from which China was hoping to gain formal statehood
recognition. "Fighting by China's armed forces, against those of the United Nations
... at the very time when Beijing was insisting upon and hoping for agreement to that
formal recognition [was not an option]."23 To this end, the central government
insisted that its soldiers were simply overcome with 'revolutionary sympathy' for
their North Korean brethren. While this was - largely - a political fiction, a
significant degree of genuine popular support was required to add some degree of
plausibility. Yet, legally, no framework for drafting soldiers existed in 1950. "The
21 Sarah Paine, The Sino-Japanese War of1894-1895 (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 34.
22 Gittings 1966, p. 83.
23 S. M. Chiu, "The Journal of Asian Studies", Vol. 27, No.2 (Feb., 1968), p. 293.
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Chinese Communists had begun work on a new military service law. Its final form
was approved by the National People's Congress in July, 1955. Up to that time, the
Communists had relied on volunteers for their source of armed personnel.,,24 Further
complicating matters, the United States, having just emerged as the dominant world
power presented a highly intimidating adversary. "In the early period of China's
entry into the war, there was among the rank and file a profound fear and a sense of
uncertainty about engaging the American forces and their superior equipment."25
Thus the Chinese entry into the Korean War was both hugely important to China
while simultaneously presenting traditional cultural aversions to soldiering, a
particularly feared adversary and a need to mobilize an entirely volunteer military
base. This was the political reality the newly consolidated Communist party found
itself in, and realizing its gravity the CCP, set about reordering the basic conception
of Chinese society.
Taking both the importance and difficulties of military requirement in
1950's China to heart, the central government began a series of nationwide
campaigns to generate the kind of mass popular support needed to promote sufficient
voluntary enlistment. First the central government appealed to patriotic pride and
nationalism to generate recruitment through loyalty to the state. While South Korea
was officially defended by the United Nations, soldiers from the United States vastly
outnumbered commitments from any other nation save South Korea itself. Given the
persisting fear among potential recruits, and no doubt their families, of directly
24 S. M. Chiu, "Far Eastern Survey", Vol. 27, No. 11 (Nov., 1958), p. 170.
25 Shu Quang Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism, (University Press of Kansas, 1995), 188.
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engaging American soldiers in battle, a key component in the successful appeal to
loyalty was the explicit blaming of America and American imperialism for the
calamities, suffering and hardships of the previous era. This was accomplished by
likening the United States to Imperial Japan and crediting the Guomindang's
existence to United States support. Organizations such as "The Chinese People's
Committee to Protect World Peace Against American Aggression" were founded to
stress the importance of understanding America's involvement in past China's
sufferings.26 A September 1950 handbook published by the 13th Army Corps Political
Department titled Historical Fact ofus. Imperialist Invasions ofChina began a
crushing narrative of Sino-American relations, highlighting events such as the unjust
Tianjin Treaty of 1858 and assistance given the Guomindang. It further stressed the
geopolitical importance of Korea stating, "U.S imperialists are trying to do the same
as Japanese imperialist have done to China, namely, to seize Korea first and invade
China second."27 The booklet ended by stating "U.S. imperialists are the most
dangerous enemy of the Chinese peop1e."28
However, creations of public sentiment and nationa110yalty were not
limited to passive literary narratives. On numerous occasions Chinese People's
Volunteers organizers arranged presentations held by Guomindang defectors who
claimed to have received personal training from American officers during the
revolution. Not only did this help place the burden of an awful and protracted civil
26 Chen Wen-hui c., Wartime "Mass" Campaigns in Communist China (Air Force Personnel and
Training Research Center, 1955), 1.
27 Shu 1995, pp. 190-191.
28 Shu 1995, p. 191.
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war on the United States, but these veterans would further explain that "American
troops were spoiled playboys," and not the hardened warriors they had been mislead
into fearing. 29 Finally, Chinese People's Volunteers officers would arrange "self-
education" activities which detailed, with great personal emotion, the atrocities
committed by Guomindang and Japanese soldiers during the past decades. These
exercises ended by linking their own experiences with those of contemporary North
Koreas. "The Chinese soldiers were led to believe that "should we allow U.S.
imperialists to invade China, they would inflict the same sufferings on our people."30
The utilization of such sentiment then became widespread in direct mass mobilization
campaigns and local calls for Chinese People's Volunteers organized by the
Volunteer Movement Committee. An article from a 1950 edition a/New China News
Agency described a recruitment drive held at a trade union branch in Beijing with the
following statement "The secretary of the branch spoke about the danger of
American attacks ... the Americans professed peaceful intentions while'aiming a
gun at our heart and preparing to pull the trigger' ."31 The article further vehemently
asserted "Any Chinese volunteering was a true patriot; he would act as a 'sentry
guarding our gates from invaders'. "32
However, while generating anxiety and animosity towards the United
States served a purpose, the ultimate goal was not simple fear or hatred but voluntary
29 Shu 1995, p. 190.
30 Shu 1995, p. 191.
31 Gittings 1966, p. 85.
32 Gittings 1966, p. 85.
14
enlistment. To that end loyalty and duty to China was linked with real action. Namely
enlistment. The official cornerstone in creating and utilizing loyalty to the state was
the November 1950 "Resist America, Aid Korea Campaign" (RAAK) which became
the central recruitment33 tool from its creation until war's end on July 27, 1953.
"[RAAK] main purpose was to generate and diffuse a popular sentiment in support of
the government's action in Korea ... namely by moral exhortations and by appeals to
the nation's sense ofpatriotism."34 While five distinct officially sanctioned mass
campaigns followed to either supplement efforts in needed areas or suppress counter
opinion in others, Resist America Aid Korea Campaign's primary task remained
convincing China's enormous and diverse population that national security and
loyalty was inexorably linked to Korea and only personal action, sacrifice and
enlistment could save China. A People's Daily (Renminbao Af.~JR i'R) article
published on December 28, 1950 explained, " ... the people of all circles are not only
spreading their patriotic ardor by speech, but also answering the call of the
Fatherland by concrete action."35
Such rhetoric continued throughout the course of the war, as a further
People's Daily article published one year later described, "They not only understand
fully that their security is inextricably linked with the fate of the Korean people, but
also feel themselves as part of the struggle and are doing their duty for it.,,36 Thus the
33. The Resist America, Aid Korea Campaign also became responsible for all manor of wartime
activities, such as stimulation of production, monetary donations and voluntary rationing that will not
be discussed here.
34 Gittings 1966, p. 87.
35 Gittings 1966, p. 92.
36 Gittings 1966, p. 92.
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historic importance of Korea as the gateway to past invasions of China combined
with the threat from America was linked to loyalty to China. Voluntary enlistment
into the Chinese People's Volunteers37 was highly encouraged as patriotic. Such
fusion of mass public sentiment and loyalty is best illustrated by the oath Chinese
People's Volunteers would take immediately before entering Korea "For the purpose
of opposing U.S. imperialist brutal aggression, assisting the national liberation
movement of the Korean brothers, and defending the interests of the Chinese ... we
enter the Korean War on our own free will. "38
Yet, for however much emphasis was placed on loyalty it seems
patriotism and enthusiastic nationalismwere, alone, insufficient to compel adequate
numbers of youths to leave their homes, families and domestic obligations. China and
its citizens, for the first time in decades, found itself in a position of geopolitical
stability in which farms, cities and households could be rebuilt. Given the
longstanding generalized animosity towards soldiering combined with filial
obligations to parents, simple appeals to loyalty, even ones so centrally located,
organized on a massive scale and so vigorously promoted as the Resist America Aid
Korea campaign, were not enough to convince families to send away able bodied
males to, at best, war for years and at worst, injury or death on the battle field. Thus,
in the persistent effort to secure sufficient voluntary enlistment the traditional
Confucian social organizational system was rearranged by offering heavy material
incentives for military enlistment. However, even in the very process of revising
37 In reality the Chinese People's Volunteers functioned as another branch of the existing PLA.
38 Shu 1995, p. 192.
-----_.._------------
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social norms, the deepseated importance of family relations and obligations to
parents could not be escaped. Chinese central leaders reorganized real incentives for
soldiering not by paying them higher salaries, giving them more political power or
even providing a substantially better military service environment. Instead, tangible
economic incentives were given to soldiers by promising to look after their families
in their stead. Indeed, this promise became a primary factor in enabling potential
military recruits to seriously consider joining the Chinese People's Volunteers. "It
was politically and socially desirable that the army in Korea and elsewhere should be
assured that their families were being looked after - in many cases they had
volunteered for service on this assumption."39 Despite the enormous mass-
mobilization efforts of Resist America, Aid Korea, traditional Chinese values still
held inescapable sway on popular action.
Given the importance of appeasing filial concerns to successful military
mobilization, Beijing set about vigorously installing tangible methods to support
soldiers families. First, like many mass campaigns of the time, an official
proclamation was issued stating "We, the people, must be responsible for their
welfare through relief and aid to their families ...we must cultivate the fields for
them, while in the city we must help their families find employment."4o City-dwelling
families received employment benefits for remaining family members, material
donations and even domestic help. In some cases special factories exclusively for
families of Chinese People's Volunteers families were opened. These factories
39 Gittings 1966, p. 93.
40 Chen Wen-hui C. 1955, p. 30.
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promised increased salary, decreased work hours and improved working conditions.
Rural families, seen to especially suffer from the absence of young males, garnered
particular attention and received further supplemental legislation to substitute blood
filial obligations between members of the village. To this end a further 'Four
guarantees' and 'five priorities,' which promised "Thorough plowing, prompt
weeding, careful cultivation and a ten percent increased crop yield," while giving
priority to Chinese People's Volunteers families in "plowing, weeding, hoeing,
harvesting and storing."41 Actual implementation of these measures was performed
by 'substitute labor,' highly reminiscent of past corvee labor obligations of imperial
China. Rural communities created special labor organizations whose sole purpose
was the systematic ordering, scheduling and implementation of surrogate labor.
Yet, despite the political primacy given these campaigns the actual
implementation of preferential treatment to families of military dependents was not
without resistance. The central government, realizing the importance ofkeeping the
soldier feeling secure in the completion of filial obligations, launched an additional
campaign to punish those not supporting the military dependents, stressing such
support was not a 'favor' but a 'duty' " ...warning against the tendency to regard
assistance for dependents as a 'personal favor;' on the contrary, it should be regarded
as a routine.,,42 Initial recruitment figures were substantially bolstered as families
became convinced they would, in fact, be well looked after in their sones) absence. In
1952 the Chinese People's Daily ran an article extolling the excellent conditions of
41 Shu 1995, p. 200.
42 Gittings 1966, p. 93.
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rural families who had sent their sons away. Not only was China worth fighting for,
but their specific military engagement against the United States was helping 'save the
farm' and the family back home.
Many dependents have written to their children at the front about
their happy life in their native places and have asked their children to
deal determined blows against the American invaders in order to
protect the happy life of their families, to safeguard their farmland
43
Thus appeasing fears of unfilial behavior was complete; joining the military was not
only an acceptable filia action in that it did not deprive the family of work, it actually
helped one's parents and family by safeguarding the secure home they, thanks to
their status as a military dependent family, now enjoyed.
Indeed, in many cases these campaigns were so successful that joining
the military became a more effective way for filial sons to support their family than
staying home and tending the fields ever could. Without becoming a narrative
regarding landholding laws in early communist China, it is sufficient to say special
'landlord exemptions' were given to dependent families allowing those already
holding land to retain, or in some cases gain, additional land beyond that of what
regular households could hold. Large landholding, once common among official
families, became the domain of military families. "The land reform law of June 1950
included ... special privileges for soldiers and their families. They would be exempted
from the category of 'landlord' and their landholding would remain untouched unless
it was markedly excessive.,,44 In northern China where recruitment was the most
successful and has precise statistics, since the area was both closer to the conflict
43 Gittings 1966, p. 95.
44 Gittings 1966, p. 86.
19
itself, and the central authority of Beijing, "...over ten per cent of China's fann land
was owned or fanned by anny dependents."45 While the mass mobilization drives
produced impressive numbers of Chinese People's Volunteers, their numbers were
nowhere close to ten percent of the region's population. When these landholding
figures are combined with the assumption that village members would help cultivate,
harvest and store crops for the family back home, the material incentive offered to
families of soldiers was truly impressive.
Having thus strongly appealed to national loyalty and subsequently
altering the classic Confucian conception of soldiering in relation to filial obligation
from a wholly unfilial act to monetarily guaranteeing the welfare of one's family, the
central government went one step further and actually inverted social prestige.
Symbols of status and recognition once reserved for scholar-officials became tools
employed to generate additional respect for the PLA, and incentive to for young men
to enlist.
The new Communist government actively set about making soldiers, and
particularly new recruits, the new Chinese elite. First, Chinese People's Volunteers
organizers directly instilled this value in prospective new soldiers. "... a deliberate
attempt was made to encourage the recruits to regard themselves as a new elite."46
Such local values were reinforced by mass communication from the central
government. In newly unified China, undergoing large-scale managerial, political and
economic changes, the inversion of past social status from scholar to soldier, was just
45 Gittings 1966, p. 93.
46 Gittings 1966, p. 80.
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one of many sweeping dynamic changes. However, neither the importance of
recruitment nor the overt central drive to complete this social shift was overlooked by
the central government at the time. Articles from large, well-circulated papers from
Shanghai to Beijing carried stories denouncing the past imperial degradation of
China's emerging elite. One Shanghai paper bluntly asserted "To counteract past
influence, they denounce the neglect of military men as a serious deviation [from the
past] in the new Communist culture pattem."47 Indeed, in the new social dynamic
envisioned, one which secured the enlistment of needed servicemen, the PLA became
central to continued Chinese security and stability. To this end central government
officials began issuing proclamations asserting the PLA'S48 close ties with Mao
Zedong himself. "[The PLA] 'made up of the best sons and daughters of the Chinese
people ... personally organized by the great leader of the Chinese people, Chairman
Mao."49 Just as past scholar-officials had once directly served the emperor, the PLA
now directly served Chairman Mao.
However, the drive to reverse an enormous collective history of social
animosity, neglect, and disdain for soldiering was not completed with pure central
rhetoric. Actual practices were implemented at the city, village and family level that
ensured the 'new social elite' would not be overlooked. First, simply joining the
Chinese People's Volunteers entitled fresh recruits and their families to special honor
and recognition throughout their respective communities. "Social approval was
47 Chen Wen-hui C. 1955, p. 32.
48 And its corollary, the newly formed Chinese People's Volunteers.
49 Gittings 1966, p. 94.
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formally accorded to such families by 'congratulation teams' organized among their
neighbors, who would visit them with gifts and ceremonial banners."5o The first
illustration, from a 1951 People's Daily article reads 'It is glorious to take part, to
oppose America, support Korea, protect the home and the nation." (Illustration 1).51
The image depicts several young soldiers, supported by their family and
congratulated by the entire village. This sense found itself duplicated in many
publications of the time. The next illustration is part of a series that details a young
soldier's life and achievements. Again, his journey began by being congratulated by
his family, and the village. (Illustration 2).52 The caption reads "Hero Wang Jiguang
born in the small town Shima in the ninth district of Jiang county Sichuan came from
a peasant family. In the 'Campaign to Resist American Aggression in Korea' he
enlisted in the army and received this ceremonious send-off. At the ceremony his
mother pinned a red rose on his breast and instructed him to 'kill many enemies and
defend the fruits of the revolution.' Such village gatherings, once enjoyed by
successful exam candidates, were now employed in completing the reversal between
dynastic officials and PLA soldiers. This honor, the ceremonial capstone that
accompanied strong centrally-driven appeals to traditional sentiments of both loyalty
and filial piety, became accessible merely upon enlistment. Given the importance of
this recognition, a second, more prestigious recognition ofPLA servicemen rewarded
50 Chen Wen-hui C. 1955, p. 45.
51 Stefan R. Landsberger, "Stefan Landsberger's Chinese Propaganda Poster Pages," (International
Institute of Social History, 1994), http://www.iisg.nl/~landsberger/index.htrnl(accessed November
8,2008).
52 Beijing: People's Daily, 1951.
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heroes who displayed outstanding valor or bravery or exemplified desirable
characteristics in battle. For these men, and perhaps most importantly for their
families, overt displays of past imperial honor were employed, leaving no doubt in
local communities that PLA heroes were indeed the new elite. One Shanghai Daily
article, published on August 5, 1951, described 'Old man Yao,' whose son had
achieved special honor in battle as "having had the happiest day of his life ...merit
banners and other gifts from the local government ...people came by groups from
neighboring villages to congratulate the Yao family."53 Such practices tied directly to
old imperial traditions. "It was a common practice for the local government to hang a
sign in front of the house of a hero or martyr. The sign reads "Glorious Family." In
old China, this form of honor was bestowed on the families of distinguished
scholars."54 The similarity between this convention and that of high-placed official
examination winners is striking. "Later Ming ... degree-holders regularly erected
memorial flagpoles or plaques in front of their homes or ancestral hall to mark their
achievements."55 This convergence would not have been missed by Korean War
contemporaries.
Thus for recruitment during the Korean war Chinese society was
fundamentally reordered in broadly reaching ways to provide sufficient incentives to
convince enough young men (and their families) to become soldiers in the Chinese
army. For the newly formed communist government this was no small task. Not only
53 Chen Wen-hui C. 1955, p. 34.
54 Benjamin A. Elman, A Cultural History ofCivil Examinations in Late Imperial China (Univeristy
of California Press, 2000), 191.
55 Elman 2000, p. 191.
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was Korea's geopolitical value fully appreciated, but the wholesale failure of mass-
mobilization campaigns to the newly established and predominantly untested ruling
communist party created serious potential for domestic disaster. Taking these
concerns to heart, and facing centuries of ingrained social disdain for soldiers, central
government officials began reordering social norms based upon long-standing
models. In doing so, central government officials did not so much create a new
system, but rather modified the old system to fit new needs. Traditional debates
between loyalty and filial piety among the once scholarly-elite were aggressively
addressed, employing powerful appeal to national loyalty while simultaneously
addressing concerns of piety and duty to one's parents, all the while providing both
nation-wide and local social incentives to recruits and their families. The PLA
became central to both administration and patriotism in China, much like the scholar-
officials had once been. The People's Daily, on June 24, 1951 claimed, "The army for
the people, the people for the army, and they are inseparable and in full
cooperation."s6 Ironically, the long-standing and deep-seated prejudices and
perceptions against soldiers required the inversion of another social group's status
with that of its own. While People's Daily message would have liked its readers to
take such assessments at face value, the reality required utilizing much deeper and
longer lasting ingrained perceptions to meet the goal of the moment.
56 Samuel B. Griffith II, The Chinese People's Liberation Army (McGraw-Hill book Company,
1967), 188.
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CHAPTER II
AGENTS OF REFORM: PLA IN PEACETIME
The mass mobilization movement seen in Resist America, Aid Korea
campaign thus helped generate the enormous number of PLA wartime volunteers,
and while suffering appalling losses, they successfully fought to a standstill the
armies of the United Nations and the United States. PLA social prestige remained
extremely high, yet many in the army thought the time had come for modernization
in training and technology to take precedent over mass campaigns primarily aimed at
creating a heroic image of an invincible army within society at large. Soon after, and
guided by soviet influence, the PLA began to undergo rather fundamental changes in
structure, recruitment and training. "In 1955, as the new People's Republic recovered
from the Korean War and passed its first Military Service Law, it sought to
institutionalize the recruitment of soldiers."s7 This recruitment system was highly
stratified and based, in large part, on a Soviet model. "The adoption of the
Regulations and the serve of officers in February 1955 formally introduced into the
PLA, as part of its movement towards regularization and professionalize, a highly
stratified system of ranks with differential pay and privileges, modeled after the
Soviet System."S8 Such movements, while considered essential by many high ranking
57Sijin Chen, "The Challenge of Conscription in an Era of Social Change," in Civil-military Relations
in Today's China, ed. David M. Finkelstein and Kristen Gunness (M. E. Sharp, 2006), 236.
58 Ying-mao Kau, The People's Liberation Army and China's Nation-Building (International Arts and
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officials of the time, effectively created an increasingly inegalitarian model of
soldiering. Primacy would now center upon creating a professional core of career
soldiers who could move up through the ranks and enjoy benefits and salaries above
the more junior members. Such a movement within the army, if allowed, would have
moved the PLA substantively away from the mass amalgamation of disparate social,
political and monetary groups previously seen.
These reforms, however, did not last. A resurgence in Maoist politics59
combined with the worsening Sino-Soviet split doomed such professionalizing
measures and created a centrally directed political backlash against many in the army,
now seen by as conspiring against the official party line. Reforms followed quickly.
Several high-ranking PLA officials identified with the modernization were purged,
Soviet army building models were criticized 6°and, most importantly, 1958 saw a
monumental resurgence of propaganda within the army ranks which continued until
1966, at which time propaganda within the PLA synchronized with that of greater
society. The language of the time, while fascinating, is no doubt highly familiar to
students of post-reform China, slogans such as "It [PLA] is a completely new type of
people's army, radically different from feudal-warlord and bourgeois armies." And
"Any class enemy, at home or abroad, who is vainly hoping for our country to change
Science Press, 1973), xxxix.
59 Specifically a Communist sense of egalitarianism. PLA modernization through professionalism
threatened such measures by potentially creating a highly respected sub-class within society that
would function in increasingly inegalitarian ways.
60 Not only did the Soviet Army model provide the theoretical framework for the new
professionalized PLA, but with the complete severance of Sino-Soviet ties in 1961 overt links to
Russia became highly criticized.
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its color must first try to make our army change its color.,,61 Yet, what is perhaps
more telling is the massive volume oftime devoted to such propaganda. One military
analyst of the time estimated that "Every young soldier receives a thorough
indoctrination into the principles, goals, and values of the Republic. In the early
1960's, fully 30-40 percent of training time was devoted to political educational
work.,,62 Virtually limitless slogans, movements and memorandas then followed.
Today one can find literally thousands of pages created by the simple CCP to military
office paper trail created in just a few years. The sheer volume attests to the
prominence given these campaigns. Many were short lived, many died off and still
others became replicated again and again. However, three political education
campaigns launched between 1958 and 1962 deserve special attention as they clearly
served as models for replication during the radical Cultural Revolution years.
First, starting nearly a decade before the first formations of a generalized
Cultural Revolution, the Politburo began a campaign to send high-ranking officials
down to the ranks with normal soldiers to do menial tasks, perform labor and learn
from the masses. "In the military, the nationwide rectification campaigns of 1957-58
against bureaucratism, dogmatism, subjectivism, and conservatism were conducted in
conjunction with a stepped-up movement to send officers, including generals, to the
ranks as privates to practice productive labor."63 A General still received a general's
pay to scrub potatoes for months, but he received orders from temporary superiors,
61 Kau 1973, pp. 73-78
62 Harvey W. Nelsen, The Chinese Military System (Thornton Cox Publishers, 1977),52.
63 Kau 1973, pp. xlii.
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duties below his stature and associated with the lowest ranks of the army.
This movement was mirrored in a mass scale initiation of party members
into the armed services. These party members came from various backgrounds and
not all received favorable positions within the military ranks. "By April 1961, party
branches were in place in every company and party cells in every platoon. In April,
an estimated 230,000 new party members joined the PLA.,,64 This system persisted,
and during the initial radical phase of the Cultural Revolution became deliberately
propagated to revolutionary radicals. "As early as 1968, a deputy chief of the general
staff announced to a Red Guard meeting that military cadres would soon be sent to do
labor in rural and frontier areas, but nothing came of that remark until the Shensi
Military District announcement of 1974."65 This speech, given ten years after the
initial Maoist PLA reforms in 1958, went substantially further than previous
experiences in the army. Instead of sending soldiers down within their own military
ranks, the PLA would literally be forced directly into broader civilian society.
Members of the central government making such comments to Red Guards helped
perpetuate the concept of forcing soldiers out of the PLA. While it is true that the 'up
to the mountains and down to the villages'66 had some impact on urban youth prior to
64 Qiu Jin, The Culture ofPower (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 75.
65 Nelsen 1977, p. 157.
66 "From December 1968 onward, millions of educated urban youth (zhishi qingnian, %JiRff~),
consisting of secondary school graduates and students, were mobilized and sent "up to the
mountains and down to the villages" C-l::. UJ r J'; J';), shangshan xiaxiang), i.e. to rural villages
and to frontier settlements. In areas, they had to build up and take root, in order to be reeducated by
the poor and lower-middle peasants. This relocation program was practiced first on a limited scale
before the Great Leap Forward Movement, resumed in the early 1960s, and accelerated sharply by
the late 1960s. While some 1.2 million urban youths were sent to the countryside between 1956
and 1966, no less than 12 million were relocated in the period 1968-1975; this amounts to an
estimated 10% of the 1970 urban population. In principle, the program called for lifelong
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fonnal Cultural Revolution politics, the vast majority of displaced urban youths came
from a generation growing up as these movements were being conducted within PLA
ranks. "While some 1.2 million urban youths were sent to the countryside between
1956 and 1966, no less than 12 million were relocated in the period 1968-1975; this
amounts to an estimated 10% of the 1970 urban population."67 In the later Cultural
Revolution period intellectual and urban youth relocation was often accomplished by
PLA assistance. Artwork of the time directly replicated this theme, tying relocation to
glorious PLA traditions. The headline, very militantly reads "Advance courageously
along the great glorious road of Chainnan Mao's May 7th Directive." Lacking the
PLA and military context, such wording would seem an odd choice for urban
intellectual youth heading for rural labor. However, in this case we see the PLA
harnessed as a strong propaganda tool in the later, wide-scale, movement that
mobilized youth to follow in the footsteps of the PLA. (Illustration 3).68 Similarly,
Quotations from Chairman Mao, one ofthe most iconic texts of the entire Cultural
Revolution era, was written only after a prior trial within the PLA. While the book
was broadly disseminated to the general Chinese public in 1966, it was Lin Biao, a
highly decorated revolutionary hero, high ranking PLA officer and close associate to
Chainnan Mao, who first compiled the work explicitly for distribution to the PLA.
resettlement in the rural areas, but toward the end of, and in particular after the Cultural
Revolution, many were finally able to find jobs or to be transferred back to the cities. A great
number of them, however, had resigned themselves to their fate and decided to remain
(Landsberger, 2008)."
67 Landsberger 1994, http://www.iisg.nl/~landsberger/xf.html (accessed November 8, 2008).
68 Stefan R. Landsberger, "Stefan Landsberger's Chinese Propaganda Poster Pages," (International
Institute of Social History, 1994), http://www.iisg.nlHandsberger/ff-nk.html (accessed November
8,2008)
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"In1960, Lin wrote the introduction to the first edition of the four-volume Mao
Zedong zhuzuo xuandu (Selected Works ofMao Zedong). In it he celebrated the
victory of the Chinese Revolution as the victory ofMao Zedong Thought.,,69 Lin
initially produced relatively few copies that he distributed to various political
officers, cadres and officers for guidelines and easily accessible Mao quotations.
However, the work soon became very popular, and by 1964 everyone in the army
owned a copy. "In November 1961 the General Political Department of the PLA
provided copies ... to every company, and over the next three years the number of
copies distributed exceeded 150 million.,,70 Following the 1964 campaign to "Learn
from the PLA" the Quotations reached a staggering level of dissemination when the
central government published at least one copy for every man, woman, and child in
China. "In May 1964 the General Political Department published the first edition ...
known as the 'Little Red Book' during the Cultural Revolution, and printed nearly a
billion copies over the next several years."7! The second edition of 1966, included on
the second page Lin Biao's autograph saying "Study Chairman Mao's writings,
follow his teachings and act according to his instructions." What began as a simple
propaganda tool, written by a military commander for aiding the political
development among recruits, became the most widely read book in modem Chinese
history. Indeed a vast majority of Cultural Revolution era art and photographs include
some reference or depiction of Quotations From Chairman Mao.
69 Jin 1999, p. 76.
70 Jin 1999, p. 76.
71 Jin 1999, p. 76.
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Beginning in 1961, five years before the fonnation of radical Red Guard
groups, the PLA began its own series ofpolitical investigations and struggle
meetings. These meetings aimed at investigating the class background, political
loyalties and revolutionary detennination of every PLA soldier. In a secret document,
dispatched to the regimental level only, the Central Committee Deputy Director
painstakingly detailed the mass campaign within PLA ranks. "The purpose of this
stage of the movement was to use the three investigations to make the anny units
stand finn in their class standpoint, whole-heartedly support the Party Line and
policy .. .'>72 Such investigations would involve several soldiers examining their
colleagues, helping them establish what wrong thinking might be present, and
encouraging self criticisms. The same document further described the particulars of
how such meetings would best be conducted. "Personal investigations must have a
central point, and each person must be investigated according to what his major
problem may be.'>?) The central government intended to use soldiers to help detect
any unfavorable behavior among other soldiers. These meetings did not center on
skills, training or military ability, rather personal politics, philosophy and loyalty to
Mao. Contemporary authors, reflecting back upon these events identify the
movement as one that aimed to homogenize beliefs (or at least their display) of all
members of the PLA. "The three investigations involve investigating standpoints ...
work and behavior record ..attitude toward the Party's line, politics and whether his
72 Chester J. Cheng, (ed), The Politics a/the Chinese Red Army (Hoover Institution Publications,
1966), 112.
73 Cheng 1966, p. 112.
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political vigilance is high ... In a word, it is to investigate class awareness.,,74
These investigation meetings were not without consequences. While
specific punishments for soldiers found harboring wrong beliefs are difficult to find,
the initial documentation points to strong punishments. "If any counterrevolutionary,
bad and seriously unlawful elements are discovered, they must be scrupulously
investigated ...and the guilty parties must be removed from the company units to be
dealt with in a special category.,,75 What this entailed is not entirely clear. However,
the instructions highlight the importance of removing such offenders in such a way to
not dampen the general movement. Being 'dealt with in a 'special category,' resulted
in individual punishments. The second, perhaps initially unforeseen, consequence of
the investigations became a broader societal replication in the years immediately
preceding the cultural revolution. One former Red Guard detailing his experiences in
1965 recalls creating a game with his fellow classmates who would form criticism
meetings to determine who had the best political views. "Once we held a red pairs
movement, which was a great success. We got the idea from the PLA, which had the
same custom. Each of the students in a class would be paired and would constantly
criticize and check each other ..."76
This explicit reproduction ofpolitics and policies instigated within in the
PLA to that of larger society was not by chance. Like many policies of this era, the
interaction of PLA values and civilian society began with a massive, centrally
74 Jin 1999, pp. 125-6.
75 Cheng 1966, p. 116.
76 Bennett, Gordan A. and Montaperto N. Ronald, Red Guard: The Political Biography ofDai Hsio-
Ai (Doubleday & Company, Inc, 1972), 24.
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conducted movement. To this end in 1964 the 'Learn From the PLA' campaign began.
Apparently the political, military and ideological reformation undergone within PLA
ranks was complete and could now be wholesale exported to other social elements.
Such macro level political and social modeling was rather explicit as the PLA
increasingly became a source of emulation among cadres, state owned enterprises and
even schools. "In 1964 and 1965, political work structures modeled on those of the
PLA were systematically introduced into civilian Party organizations... school
systems and economic enterprises."77 Such programs generated substantial political
longevity. In 1970 the New China News Agency stated "In the new era the PLA has
shown new growth. This is the result of instructions from the Party Central
Committee and the Command of Mao-Tse-tung...Study on large scale the PLA.,,78
Learning the proper revolutionary model by studying the PLA became a popular and
long lasting slogan and encouragement. Indeed, throughout the 1960's and most of
the 1970's a high degree of engagement between PLA soldiers and civilians became
encouraged, linking the PLA directly to the people. In 1965 the Liberation Daily ran
an article stating "Our army and people are bonded by flesh and blood and are as
closely related as fish and water." (Kau, 103) Such policies helped give abstract
principals and propaganda a human face. PLA soldiers themselves were identified as
firmly committed comrades, exemplars to emulate and even as individual teachers.
Another Liberation Daily article asserted, "They [PLA] regard the spreading ofMao
Tse-tung's ideas as their binding duty and the most fundamental task in carrying out
77 Kau 1973, p. xxxi.
78 Kau 1973, pp. 206-219.
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work among the masses of the people."79 (Illustration 4).80
Perhaps the most famous example of this personal engagement between
PLA ideals and broader society is the 'Study Lei Feng' campaign. In 1963 one of
China's most enduring figures made his first public, posthumous, appearance.
Having died in a construction accident, Lei Feng's diary was discovered, published
and held up as a shining example of selflessness, correct political consciousness and
loyalty. His thinking was thus used as a model for all to follow. "Beginning in 1963
the entire nation was encouraged to espouse the political loyalty, ideological
commitment, and behavioral norms ofPLA heroes like Lei Feng.,,81 Later annotated
versions of this diary appeared, adding insight to various meaningful moments of his
life. One edition, published in 1968 titled Lei Feng, Chairman Mao's Good Fighter
carried instructions written by Lin Biao himself, stating 'Follow the example set by
Comrade Lei Feng and be Chairman Mao's good fighters." In this edition two
specific moments are identified as the happiest in Lei Feng's life -the PLA liberating
his village during the war years, and his later joining the PLA himself.
Riding on the success of Lei Feng, other revolutionary PLA martyrs were
soon escalated to national fame. In 1965 the New China News Agency and
Liberation Army Daily ran a story praising Wang lie, whose life experience shared a
remarkable similarity to that ofFeng. He suffered before communism, felt saved by
Mao and the party, joined the PLA, and eventually died in a construction accident.
79 Kau 1973, p. 109.
80 Landsberger 1994, http://www.iisg.n1/-1andsberger/xf.htrnl (accessed November 8, 2008)
81 Kau 1973, p. xxx.
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His selflessness was particularly praised. The article explained how "On his way to a
bookshop one Sunday morning with [another soldier] Wang Jie saw a long line of
carts full of stones being hauled by workers across a bridge. He [and the other
soldier] immediately began to help the workers ..."82 The initial article made these
similarities explicit, stating "He set Lei Feng up as his model, measuring everything
he did by his actions."83 During the Cultural Revolution's radical period, civilian
industries took learning from the PLA and Lei Feng to heart. One draft, written by a
subordinate transportation department in Beijing, titled its work model as 'Learn from
the Liberation Army in Political Work.'84 This booklet, published in 1967, naturally
gave primacy to Mao Zedong's thinking, but learning from the PLA, and Lei Feng,
became a vehicle for greater understanding of such highly praised revolutionary
ideals.
However, this interpersonal and human aspect of of the PLA's role in
communicating centrally approved values was not limited to dead martyrs,
newspapers or even propaganda posters. During this era the PLA had real human
faces. First, statewide news began extolling the long-time willingness, desire and
virtue of individuals to learn from the glorious PLA. Another People's Daily article
dating from 1966 asserted "The masses of people in our country have always seen the
Liberation Army as an example from which to learn...This has played a tremendous
82 Kau 1973, p. 226.
83 Kau 1973, p. 224.
84 Joseph W. Esherick, Paul Pickowicz and Andrew Walder, eds., Chinese Cultural Revolution as
History (Stanford University Press, 2006), 65.
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role in advancing our country's socialist revolution."85 The PLA soldiers themselves
were subsequently identified as fierce and unwavering in their desire to help spread
the words of Mao and the Communist Party. On August 1st 1966 New China News
Agency carried an extremely interesting and lengthy story regarding a PLA unit that
marched across the countryside administering medical care to sick villagers, while
most importantly, helping spread true revolutionary ideals they had perfected during
service in the army.
"They [PLA] regard the spreading of Mao Tse-tung's
ideas as their binding duty and the most fundamental task
in carrying out work among the masses of the people.. .In
the course of a long-distance march, a company under the
Peking Military Command passed through 32 country
towns and more than 300 villages and hamlets. During
the march, the commanders and fighters of the company
gave priority to spreading Mao Tse-tung's ideas among
the people. In any village where they stopped, they told
the peasants about their own experiences in studying and
applying Mao-Tse-tung's writings86
Emphasis added
The experiences of this troop was laced with Maoist Communist ideals, and drew
strength from the revolutionary years and the formation of the PLA when it was
creating its image as a likable military faction. This was accomplished by telling
heroic tales of the Long March and the selflessness ofPLA soldiers. The value of
learning from their thinking, of course, was then linked to the prominence of learning
Mao Zedong thought. During this era PLA soldiers routinely interacted with all levels
of society. Those familiar with the life ofLei Feng will remember substantial pages
detailing his experience tutoring young school children. Not only could Lei Feng
85 Kau 1973, p. 220.
86 Kau 1973, pp. 109-110.
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teach his 'little comrades' how to read, write or do arithmetic, he also taught them
simple, wholesome, communist life lessons. The 1972 recorded memories of a
former Red Guard details how in 1965 this middle school-aged male "...spent a lot of
time with the PLA. Between militia lessons, exchange visits, joint athletic meets, and
joint recreation parties, we got to know many of the soldiers very well ...We would
mingle with the troops, ask them questions and try to emulate them.,,87 While various
personal or incriminating aspects of political memories are no doubt highly suspect,
the overall narrative fits extremely well with the mass campaigns of the time. Later,
this same youth very explicitly stated that his desire to became a Red Guard stemmed
directly from heroic PLA images, his time spent with, and admiration of, PLA
soldiers. "Films depicting the heroism of the PLA and the constant drive to "learn
from the army" had given all of us a very good impression of soldiers ... The Red
Guards were presented as a reserve force of the army...We could be soldiers too. Who
would not have joined?"88 Again, given the omnipresence of posters, photos and
news sources extolling the virtue, courage and socialist charisma found in the PLA
such reflection seems highly credible.
Normative ideals formed within the PLA and subsequently transmitted to
civilian society found one additional avenue of dissemination. Without detailing
force numbers, levels of recruitment or draft regulations, suffice to say the PLA had
an enormous number of soldiers before, during and after the Cultural Revolution.
These soldiers did not forever remain in the PLA. One military analyst writing in
87 Bennett et al1972, p. 23.
88 Bennett et a11972, p. 67.
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1974 claimed "Since 1949, about 15 million men have been released from the
PLA.,,89 Considering the average age of revolutionary era soldiers was rather young,
one may reasonably assume these individuals remained active participants withing
broader society before and during the Cultural Revolution years. However, while 15
million is a large number, other subsidiary branches of the PLA formed in even larger
numbers. The People's Militia, while not primarily a fighting force, nevertheless
received military training, combat techniques and most importantly many hours of
political teachings. "During the middle and late 1960's the anned and basic militia
forces numbered some 23 to 29 million members. While not nonnally allowed to
bear arms, these militiamen [and women] received basic military training, in both
weapons and politics.,,9o This image, dating from 1969, plainly states "Organize
contingents of the People's Militia on a big scale." (Illustration 5).91 While perhaps
lacking in literary luster, the image draws upon all the powerful propaganda tools of
the time. Documentation of this era inextricably refers to 'workers, peasants and
soldiers' as the three good classes within society. In this one image we see a peasant
(presumably identified by his straw hat), a worker in overalls, and a man wearing
military fatigues. They wear Mao badges, they hold high Quotations from Chairman
Mao and they march under a red banner. This enormous pool of secondary soldiers
received not only centrally approved and propagated ideological training, but their
formation was further legitimized by their dissemination of revolutionary ideals to
89 Nelsen 1977, p. 20.
90 Nelsen 1977, pp. 23-24.
91 Landsberger 1994, http://www.iisg.nll~landsberger/index.htm1(accessed November 8, 2008).
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greater society. In many ways this was a simple recruitment tool, but it further served
to enhance their normative political power. The numbers of militiamen and women,
added to the already gigantic pool of demobilized regular soldiers formed during this
era, carried important political power. Modem historical examinations of famous
Cultural Revolution-era incidents, communes and power seizures note the
prominence this particular style of military political indoctrination among
demobilized soldiers gave movements. In their work detailing the Shanghai
commune, Elizabeth Perry and Li Xun recount the memory of one former red guard
saYIng:
Their many years of military life had imbued these demobilized
sailors [a branch of the PLA] with a particular work style and mind
set. During successive political campaigns, the demobilized sailors
were more leftist than the local cadres and more apt to subject
people to criticism. This was principally due to the fact that political
work received particular emphasis in the military, especially from
the 1960's on, when the PLA stressed "class struggle" more than
society at large.92
Thus, the sheer numbers of regular PLA and militia, the importance of politics in
their training and the value placed upon learning from the PLA created an
enormously forceful and compelling ideological tool. Such values found outlets in
propaganda, personal interactions and even post-official PLA membership. Values
formed, or forcefully developed in the armed forces, during the preceding years
through successive military campaigns, were now finding a normative role in larger
society.
Finally, civil-military interactions of this era also operated on a purely
administrative basis. However, in detailing these norms one must understand the
92 Elizabeth Perry and Li Xun, Proletarian Power: Shanghai in the Cultural Revolution (Westview,
1997), 132.
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complexities of the time. The PLA's direct involvement in macro level Cultural
Revolution events can be broadly defined as either organizational or participatory.
Perhaps the clearest example of instrumental PLA organizational involvement in this
era were the 1966 Red Guard Tiananmen Square rallies. During this time the PLA
often found itself the only organization truly capable of creating or maintaining any
real order, and even amid the chaos, this order was sometimes needed. This was
especially true in the youthfully Red Guard organizations. While the Red Guard
movement initially formed from organic and spontaneous youth movements, within
several months the central government instructed local PLA commanders to assist in
the training, idolization and even organization oflocal Red Guard groups. " ...on
December 31, 1966 when the PLA was ordered to give 'short term military and
political training' to Red Guards in schools throughout China. Such training was
categorized as militia work, and hence the responsibility of the regional PLA."93
Indeed, many of the Cultural Revolution's most vivid and engrossing images would
not have been possible without direct logistic support provided by the army.
"Between August 18 and November 26 [1966] Lin Biao's army organized and
provided the logistics to mount eight Red Guard rallies in Beijing's Tiananmen
Square."94 Reading former Red Guard memoirs, the PLA structural involvement is
quite clear. " ...PLA soldiers had been assigned to our ranks, not only to keep order
but also to lead us in political activity."95 Such organizational involvement created
93 Nelsen 1977, p. 27.
94 Yarong Jiang and David Ashley, Mao's Children in the New China (Routledge, 2000), 5.
95 Bennett et aI1972, p. 111.
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little trouble or controversy within the PLA structure. Indeed, public organization of
these youth helped strengthen the revolutionary image of the PLA, without
compromising its own interests. This was not true of all Cultural Revolution era
events.
While general normative ideals and ideas can be traced through PLA
motifs, propaganda and personal interaction the true impact of direct participatory
PLA involvement within the radical era of the Cultural Revolution is far more
complex. However, these complexities, once umaveled, create perhaps the most vivid
evidence of how socially, politically and organizationally important the PLA was to
the Cultural Revolution era. During the radical phase of the Cultural Revolution, the
PLA found itself caught between its carefully crafted image, the desires of Mao and
radical revolutionaries on one hand and the realities of mandating order on the other.
Often this meant disobeying the directives issued by Mao and other central power
holders. Initially painstaking efforts where made to keep the PLA distant from the
chaos. Not only are soldiers and demonstrators a poor mix, but Mao risked
destabilizing the army and the last line of party power. However, this decision was
soon overruled and on January 1, 1967, the Liberation Army Daily called on the PLA
to "actively participate in and defend the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution."96
Yet, in the wake of the disasters ofthe Great Leap Forward the army was
simultaneously ordered to safeguard agricultural and industrial production. " ...The
PLA [was] expected to play contradictory roles: it was expected to support the left in
96 Nelsen 1977, p. 77.
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the power seizure, while ensuring production."97 Further compounding matters, the
PLA became charged with imposing a 'great alliance' of radical Red Guard groups in
attempts to curb factionalism. Such orders, issued by the political center, led to
differences of interpretation at the local level. Thus regional commanders faced with
decisions on the ground often sided with less radical organizations in their attempts to
preserve order. " ...The army usually supported the less radical rebel organizations in
the interest of stability. Charged with the often conflicting tasks of assisting the
revolutionary efforts of the masses and maintaining social and economic order, army
commanders usually preferred order."98
This is, however, only half the reason why the PLA, the championed
upholder of Maoist ideals, often sided against the most radical Cultural Revolution
organizations. In reading the PLA involvement in events between 1966 and 1969 one
must constantly remember how big the PLA was in numbers and how large China's
territory is. Politics applied in one unit is not necessarily representative of another's
experiences. First, PLA units at that time tended to come from and were stationed in
their geographic location of origin.99 Furthermore, local PLA commanders had long
sought good standing with party committees. "The PLA in general had maintained a
good relationship with the power holders, especially with the provincial Party
97 Hong Yung Lee, The Politics ofthe Chinese Cultural Revolution (University of California,
Berkeley, 1978), 189.
98 Maurice Meisner, Mao's China and After: A History ofthe People's Republic, third edition (Free
Press, 1999), 334.
99 Most modem armies do not leave soldiers stationed in native places for fear of conflicting loyalties
and extra-administrative ties.
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Committees."IOo These relations, established before the radical phase of the Cultural
Revolution, were hard to break, and contemporary reflection on micro level Cultural
Revolution politics highlights these local bonds. "The Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution revealed a great deal of localisms because units had not been moved
about."IOl In addition, local PLA commanders and soldiers often had their own set of
beliefs and values. These sometimes conflicted with the goals of the Cultural
Revolution. A particularly vivid example was PLA soldiers rallying to protect the
birthplace of Confucius from a radical Red Guard organization. "The demolitionists
only retreated when the officer ordered a platoon of soldiers to link arms and
blockade the main hall. "Nobody wanted to clash with the People's Liberation
Army.,,102 During the chaos of the Cultural Revolution soldiers often found
themselves in opposition to the central government's official goals.
These events did not go unnoticed by Mao and the center. By late mid-
1967 Mao reportedly asserted that "75 percent of the regional military organizations
were supporting the rightists."103 Under central pressure, the Liberation Army Daily
even began running stories covering the paradox between the PLA ideal and local
realities. "They [capitalist roaders in army] use militia to arrest, assault and even
detain ...the proletarian revolutionaries."lo4 Following these complicities, radical
youth organizations began to form within PLA schools themselves. "Despite the
100 Lee 1978, p. 189.
101 Nelsen 1977, p. 217.
102 Esherick et a12006, p. 83.
103 Jin 1999, p. 91.
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strenuous effort to prevent a full Cultural Revolution within the PLA, the PLA
students in the military academies and schools had split into radicals and
conservatives... "105 The chaos began to effect even the PLA and many officers where
attacked and PLA warehouses were raided. Some radicals attacked a military convoy
bound for Northern Vietnam. "To obtain the [arms], the mass organizations even
raided Air Force units in Sinkiang and trains in Kwangsi carrying military aid to
North Vietnam."lo6 Reportedly, the attacks against PLA soldiers became so common
that guards patrolling the Russian border stopped carrying guns for fear of having
them confiscated by radical youths, and some units buried their arms while others
simply stopped normal operations.107
Ironically, this brief but turbulent disorder within the PLA ranks that
threated its ability to function is perhaps the most telling example of how
instrumental the PLA had become to late Maoist China. Despite the chaos, the PLA
had become the one organization capable of restoring any real order. While 'three-in-
one' committees made up ofPLA officers, cadres and representatives of the masses
theoretically administrated the provinces, in reality the PLA truly ran operations in
the provinces. Despite the chaos in its ranks, the PLA still manged to weather the
storm better than any other mass organization in China.
In March 1967, Red Flag announced that so-called "three-in-one"
organs made up of the People's Liberation Army officers,
revolutionary cadres, and representatives of the "masses" would
replace Party and government organs of the past...With the party
105 Lee 1978, p. 185.
106 Lee 1978, p. 282.
107 While such stories are wide-spread specific and named accounts are less readily available due to a
mix of shame and fear of punishment at failure to obey orders.
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organization in tatters and the "masses" divided and circumscribed
in their political freedoms, the Revolutionary committees became
dorrrinated by the PLA... 108
As the Cultural Revolution reached its less radical phase, Mao's first directive
became restoring the political legitimacy and primacy of the PLA. This was
accomplished by distancing the attacks against capitalists in the party from those in
the army. To this end, on September 5, 1967 Mao stated "The handful ofpersons
within the party taking the capitalist road should not be lumped together with the
group of people taking the capitalist road in the military. We should mention only the
handful in the Party and strive to make the military a success. There must be no chaos
in the army."\09 Further steps were taken to restore the somewhat battered prestige of
the PLA. Shortly following his first statement Mao bluntly asserted "The army's
prestige must be resolutely safeguarded. There can be no doubt whatever about
that...The chief danger at the moment is that some people want to beat down the
PLA."\lO Restoration of order was not immediate, but soon the PLA was ordered to
forcibly end the first, radical, phase of the Cultural Revolution. Thus, restoration of
order began with restoration of the PLA.
108 Esherick et al 2006, p. 31.
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CHAPTER III
END OF THE MAO PERIOD - THE PLA IN DECLINE
The re-empowered PLA began restoring order throughout the cities and
provinces. This was not always an easy task, and often PLA commanders opted for
replacing civilian leaders with military. "Where the PLA could not form an alliance
with remaining revolutionary cadres and the revolutionary masses, Military Control
Committees were established to maintain order."11l However, peaceful replacement
of power was not always possible. The violence, and often endemic chaos, that had
first driven the central party to bring about a military restoration of order did not
instantly cease. Accounts vary as to the exact extent ofPLA violence in the following
months. Some claim the PLA acted with amazing restraint, while others assert
widespread massacres. " ...The greatest atrocities and a heavy share of the killings
appear to have been the work of the PLA, especially in the general repression of
radical Red Guards and workers' organizations in the summer of 1968."112 Wherever
the truth may lie, in the process of restoring order across China, the PLA found itself
in a position of enormous tangible power. "By 1971, military officers occupied
approximately fifty percent of civilian central leadership positions and sixty to
seventy percent of most provincial leadership jobs."113
111 Graff 2002, p. 256.
112 Meisner 1999, p. 354.
113 Graff 2002, p. 256.
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This military takeover though sanctioned by the central committee did
not last. Starting in 1971, Mao began rhetoric designed to reign in the social prestige,
cultural dominance and emulation of the PLA in popular society. During Mao's 1971
provincial tour the first signs of the Party's (or at least Mao's) desire to control more
tightly the daily minutiae of the military was seen. Mao began telling various
regional commanders, "It would be putting the cart before the horse if matters
already decided by regional Party committees were later turned over to the army
Party committees for discussion."114 Following on the heels of Mao's tour, official
propaganda began laying the foundations for what would later become central
directives. While earlier political campaigns had stressed the importance of wide
scale learning from the PLA in order to better understand Mao, the Party and
Communism, late period Cultural Revolution politics placed heavy emphasis on the
PLA following the party and even learning from the people. "A decade earlier
Maoists had established the PLA as the model of universal emulation, but now
slogans ofthe day enjoined the PLA to 'learn the fine work style of the Party' and to
"learn from the people ofthe whole country".115 Even the persistently popular Lei
Feng became subject to revision. While the roots of his original popularity lay in
selfless devotion to those around him, and especially the PLA, later works stressed
his devotion to the Party. " ...unlike the early 1960s (when Lei Feng was presented as
a military hero before the public), his Party membership was placed first and he was
admired for the 'splendid example' he put before the Chinese people by "...his [Lei
114 Meisner 1999, p. 386.
115 Meisner 1999, p. 386.
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Feng] utter devotion to the Party and to the socialist cause."1l6 In the following year
many centrally published articles began reiterating the same message. One
particularly famous editorial was published on August 1st 1972, and was carried by
People's Daily, Liberation Army Daily and Red Flag, the three largest papers in
China at that time, "unequivocally reaffirming the absolute leadership of the Party
over the army and, indeed, over all institutions of society.. .it laid stress on the
maintenance of a stem discipline, a spirit of complete obedience to the Party and a
consciousness of revolutionary traditions."117
While the foundations existed in early 1971 to begin limiting the political
role of the PLA, it was the Lin Biao affair that ultimately resulted in, or perhaps fully
enabled, Mao and the top CCP leadership to curtail the army's political representation
and power. To this day no universally accepted explanation exists for why on the
night of September 13, 1971 Lin Biao and his family fled Beijing aboard a military
aircraft, or why later that night the airplane mysteriously crashed over Mongolia. The
official explanation was, and remains, that Biao attempted a military coup, failed, and
fled. The crash itself remains unexplained, though Chinese officials deny
involvement. What, however, is no mystery is how Mao and others within the party
reacted to the affair. Burying Lin was no easy task - for years he had been acclaimed
Mao's 'right hand man', while magazines and newspapers of the time featured him
almost as prominently as Mao. It took nearly a year for news of Lin's death to reach
the general public, and dealing with the death was a central concern at the 1973 Tenth
116 J. P. Jain, After Mao, What? (Westview Press, 1975),81.
117 Jain 1975, p. 80.
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Congress of the CCP (August 24-28) that marked a turning point in the PLAts
political power, monetary endowment and organizational prominence.
The first, and foremost, order ofbusiness became asserting the absolute
power of the Party over all sectors of society and government. Zhou Enlai stressed
"Of the seven sectors - industry, agriculture, commerce, culture and education, army,
the government and the Party - it is the Party that exercises overallleadership."ll8
Immediately following Zhou's rhetoric came tangible measures designed to limit
individual commanders' agency. One longstanding concern among those who felt the
PLA had too much power was that the strong bonds and loyalties commanders could
form between their soldiers. The soldiers often came from the same provinces and
cities as the commanders. Additionally the political commissars commanders worked
with would often be assigned to the same unit for many years in a row. Thus ties
between soldiers and commanders and the CCP's political arm within the ranks could
often outweigh obedience to central directives. For those who wished greater control
over the PLA limiting the associations between commanders and their troops became
a central concern. "...A vigorous attempt was made to strengthen Party leadership
over the army, to curb the political role of the military leaders, and to discourage the
practice of the concurrent holding of civilian and military power.,,119 To this end
"they [commanders] were removed from the command of their troops and from their
local power bases where they had established themselves for many years (in one case
nearly twenty). Moreover the transfer had been arranged in such a manner that no
118 Meisner 1999, p. 390.
119 Jain 1975, p. 90.
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commander was permitted to take with him the political commissars he had worked
with."120 While the true cause of the Lin Biao affair remains unsatisfactorily
explained, and we may perhaps never know exactly what happened, one result was a
massive and widespread campaign to limit the power of the PLA. "Whatever
explanation emerges when the CCP archives are finally opened, Mao's use of the Lin
Biao affair to begin a drive to eradicate PLA dominance of the CCP is not in
doubt.,,121
However, curbing the power and prestige the PLA had amassed did not
end with moving commanders away from loyal troops and friendly commissars.
Soon, its representation in the Politburo was under attack. Beginning in 1973
Politburo members with military experience, especially those linked to Lin Biao,
were either purged, or more often than not, new non-military members were added to
reduce the percent ofPLA representation. "...army representation was reduced from
about 45% in the Ninth Central Committee to a little more than 30% in the Tenth. Of
the 45 regular members of the Ninth Central committee who were dropped from the
Tenth committee (including 10 members who had died), were military leaders
belonging to the Lin Biao faction ... "122 Thus by the 1975 military affairs commission
(MAC) Deng Xiaoping was in a position to openly criticize the PLA on five points.
"In a speech on July 14, Deng Xiaoping summed up the shortcomings of the PLA in
120 Jain 1975, p. 91.
121 Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao's Last Revolution (Harvard University
Press, 2006), 336.
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five words, "bloating, laxity, conceit, extravagance, and inertia."123 Conceit and
extravagance became the chief concerns leveled against the PLA. Deng charged army
commanders of"seek[ing] ease and comfort, higher salaries, more housing space,
and indeed top conditions in every respect."124 Like earlier speeches, the 1975 MAC
carried real consequences, and "...the MAC for the first time ... stipulated exactly
how many cars, domestic staff, and secretaries a high ranking PLA officer had a right
to.,,125 The PLA soon found itself affected by many similar measures. This trend
continued until 1978 at the Eleventh Central Committee when, in groundbreaking
redirection of society, Deng Xiaoping officially launched his Four Modernizations.
"The Third Plenum of the Communist Party's Eleventh Central committee in
December 1978 was the watershed event that redirected China's national focus to
economic modernization. The Four Modernizations were adopted as national policy,
and as this was done the ranking of defense modernization was slipped to last."126
123 MacFarquhar et a12006, p. 389.
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CHAPTER IV
DENG XIAOPING'S NEW CHINA - PLA MODERNIZATION
Following these refonns the PLA found itself removed from a position of
direct influence on society, and it became, for possibly the first time in its creation, a
purely military organization. "The PLA had completed the process of "returning to
the barracks" ( i.e removing itself from involvement in all aspects of civil society),
and has subordinated its modernization to the larger task of national economic
development."127 Thus began a period oflow priority given to the PLA in both
Chinese society and scholarship. Three primary factors worked against the PLA
during this time.
First, China had, as a whole, become tired of mass political campaigns.
"[The] ...population [had] grown cynical and politically apathetic [and] could no
longer be easily inspired by old revolutionary slogans and ideological
exhortations."128 During the PLA's early years, mobilization, success in battles and
recruitment had all depended upon its ability to generate large levels of popular
support. This had always been accomplished through mass political campaigns.
Indeed scholarship of the early PLA has trouble differentiating the two.
Subsequently, during the Mao years the army had been held up as a shining example
127 Graff 2002, p. 260.
128 Meisner 1999, p. 525.
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of proper behavior, morals and communist spirit.
However, following the Cultural Revolution's end the PLA had been
openly and publicly criticized. Moreover, with Deng's new China politics were
withdrawing from Chinese societal primacy. The PLA followed, and began directing
training exclusively towards military matters. "Political and ideological training
stressed the military rather than the social, ideological, or economic role of the
PLA."129 For the first time since its formation the PLA found itself out of the political
arena. Even the social peacekeeping role the PLA had played was redirected to a new
quasi-military branch, the People's Armed Police (PAP), to further the divide
between PLA and society. "In the early 1980s, the Chinese leadership decided to re-
establish a dedicated force for internal security duties."130
Secondly, in the early Deng years economic modernization did not
include the PLA. Special economic zones, factories and power plants all became
hallmarks of this era, but the army was left out of these developments. PLA generals
were told (and for the most part willingly complied) to wait for advancements in
other sectors of the Chinese economy until focus would eventually return to them.
During these years, the PLA withdrew from the social spotlight. "The PLA was
tasked to modernize and professionalize, but it would be low on the list for
government resources. Thus, military modernization became a long-term goal,
dependent upon first strengthening the overall Chinese economy.,,131 Save for a brief
129 John Pike, "PLA History" (Global Security, 2008)
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period in defense priority during the China-Vietnam war in 1979, the PLA simply
ceased to occupy the significant role in society it had once held. Finally, in 1985
Deng went one step further in removing the PLA from direct societal interaction. He
formally declared the threat of major war for China remote. "In a major strategic
reassessment, Deng declared in 1985 that the threat of major wars was remote.
Instead, Deng forecast the more likely scenario would be a limited 'Local War' fought
on China's periphery. A reduction of another million personnel was also
announced."132
Thirdly, the PLA faced major budget deficits. "The process of creating a
leaner professional force began with a decisive Central Military Commission (CMC)
meeting in June 1985 when the PLA was set on a new course...and succeeded in
freeing up close to ten percent of the national budget."133 During the period of Deng's
leadership, the main PLA force was reduced by nearly two million. Yet, even with
these cuts the army itself began entering into civilian society and began running
civilian enterprises simply to raise enough money to buy equipment, pay salaries and
modernize. Budget deficits became so bad that for a number of years the PLA grew
much of its own food. "The PLA was required to grow much of its own food, and
produce in its factories many of the light industrial goods necessary for basic survival
and mission accomplishment."134
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CHAPTER V
TIANANlVIEN SQUARE, POLITICAL FALLOUT
Between 1979 until 1989 military spending continued to decline by a
considerable margin every year. "Officials [of the Chinese military] claim between
1979 and 1989 military spending declined by an average of 5.8% a year."135 By 1989
the situation faced by soldiers, their families and social institutions had deteriorated
significantly from the former glorious days of the Korean War and early Cultural
Revolution politics. "First, the military budget ... had shrunk... Military families saw
their living standards falling behind those of civilians...The government lacked an
effective policy for helping military personnel transfer to civilian jobs...and civilians
had little understanding of the military, and the once fervent popular concern for the
welfare of soldiers was a thing of the past."136 Indeed, during the military
involvement in the 1989 Tiananmen protest and subsequent massacre, PLA
organization, quartering and general ability had deteriorated to such a degree that
many soldiers went long periods without food provided by the army, some had no
ammunition and others lacked basic utilities. "...The soldiers in the Square
[Tiananmen 1989] had almost nothing to eat from Sunday to Tuesday...The Martial
Law forces ran out of other things besides food. On Tuesday, some units were
135 editor, Q&A: China's Military Budget (BBC, 2008) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/1ow/asia-
pacific/7277382.stm (accessed November 8, 2008).
136 Andrew 1. Nathan and Perry Link (ed), The Tiananmen papers (PublicAffairs, 2001), 9.
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sending soldiers out to scour local shops for batteries."137 Ironically, the degree the
PLA had been allowed to deteriorate became a key component in a major reversal in
the CPC's attitude towards PLA funding, prestige and modernization.
In the lead-up to the June military crackdown on students, intellectuals
and workers in and around Beijing and Tiananmen Square, the Chinese central
leadership was faced with three issues regarding the effectiveness ofpromising
military force, the deployment of soldiers and ultimately the use of grave physical
violence. First, many of the Tiananmen protesters felt that the CCP either would not
or could not use the military against them. Many different reasons existed for this
belief. Shen Tong from Peking University, one of the student leaders, felt that they
had a right to peaceful organization and protest. Peking University had, after all, been
the site of many student led movements that had changed the course of Chinese
history. "The students were aware that the Army could pose a threat to the
Movement, 'but we felt that ifwe did not go too far, the Army would not present a
real danger,.,,138 Others felt the loyalty of the PLA soldiers stationed in and around
Beijing belonged with the city they lived in, rather than the central government -
specifically, the 38th group army, one unit that had received some funding and
modernization remained stationed around Beijing and had become an example of
what the Chinese military might achieve on a army-wide scale in the near future.
Many citizens of Beijing felt this elite unit 'belonged' to Beijing and thus would not
move against them. "Whether rightly or not, the 38th [Group Army] is [was]
137 Brook 1992, p. 209.
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generally regarded by Beijing people as 'their' army."139 Further, as developments
arose, many protesters began to feel the army itself would side with the people. The
following story is of dubious factual validity, yet thanks to leaflets printed out and
distributed by the protectors has become widely believed. The story states that
"General Xu Jiangxian [the commander ofthe 38th group army]. .. refused to lead the
38th into position as part ofthe martial law force."14o As the story went, the General
asserted "I've already thought this through early on and have prepared myself," he is
reported to have said "The people's army has a history of never having suppressed the
people. I cannot sully that history."141 While the General went to prison for
disobeying his orders, such stories circulated widely, and eventually it was felt that
"The officers urged that the PLA [should] not be used to suppress the students ... The
students now dared to think that the government could not mobilize the armed forces
against them."142
Indeed, the students were not entirely wrong in presuming the military
leaders, the 38th group army and certainly individual soldiers had no wish to enter
into a wide scale suppression and possibly even Cultural Revolution style aggression
with students and Beijing residents. The CCP felt it could not rely on the 38 th group
army and its nearly 200,000 soldiers stationed in Beijing, and thus brought in
soldiers from neighboring provinces unburdened with conflicting loyalties. "...There
139 Brook 1992, p. 29.
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are [were] more than 200,000 troops stationed in the Beijing Military Region,
adequate to suppress a military coup. Instead of relying on the local army, Deng's
headquarters had to bring in army units from other parts of the country.,,143 These
new soldiers were picked from rural provinces with few ties to Beijing. One firsthand
account notes how out of place these soldiers looked. "One eyewitness noted that 'the
soldiers looked disoriented. They stared around as though they have never seen
skyscrapers before, as though they had never been to Beijing."144 Beyond simply
moving in soldiers foreign to Beijing, the CMC began a Cultural Revolution style
political campaign to bring 'correct thinking' back into the minds of the soldiers who
they were asking to exert force against civilians. The propaganda focused on
asserting the need for social stability which was threatened and destabilized by
unreasonable demands by the students.
An urgent notice from the PLA General Political Commanders
Department disseminated to all commanders in the Beijing area read "They [soldiers]
should lead the troops to a correct understanding of how important stability is for the
country and to the realization that what people really want is stability...Second, they
should help the troops and officers analyze which of the students slogans were
reasonable ... etc."145 Further, the CCP greatly feared association between the soldiers
and the protesters. Bonds between soldiers and those who they might be asked to use
force against, who were often of very similar age groups, were feared to weaken their
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resolve in following such commands. An April 26 editorial, carried in Red Flag,
required all officers and soldiers to study the editorial read "Any person sent out of
business or a mission must be educated well and strictly instructed not to become a
looker-on, not to join any debates, and not to participate in any trouble. No officers or
soldiers are pennitted to go among the students to network. ..never allow students to
come among them."I46 Even with such political measures, Deng Xiaoping himself
had to address the Martial Law Troops on 9 June 1989 saying "...although some
comrades may not understand this for a while, they will eventually understand this
and support the CC's decision..."I47
Despite obvious trepidation and some misgiving about the PLA re-
entering civilian politics, the PLA ultimately obeyed the CCP's orders to clear out
Tiananmen square and forcibly restore order to Beijing. However, it appears
participation in the military intervention became something of a taboo subject. Either
out of personal shame, or fear of negative public opinion, few soldiers admit to
having participated in the forceful dispersion of the protectors. One reporter who
interviewed several units of soldiers in 1992 reports that "Participation in martial law
is now [1992] regarded as a matter of shame. If asked, every PLA officer and soldier
will insist that his unit was not involved in the massacre."I48 Another widespread
story involves watches given to the soldiers involved to honor their compliance.
Shortly after the bloodshed in Beijing, many soldiers
involved in the military action were awarded silver
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wristwatches for their participation. At the top of the
watches' yellow face was a red outline of the Tiananmen
rostrum; on the bottom, a profile of a PLA soldier wearing a
green helmet. Under the soldier were the figures "89.6" (for
the date June 1989) and the characters "In Commemoration
of Quelling the Rebellion." Inscribed on the back were the
characters "presented by the Beijing committee of the
Chinese Communist Party and the People's Government of
Beijing." In the following years, these watches were often
found in flea markets in Beijing, broken, their hands no
longer working, discarded by the soldiers to whom they had
been presented. 149
All such accounts give special prominence to the number of these watches in poor
condition found in the following years.
Ultimately, while the PLA followed orders and violently moved against
the protesters, this command was not accomplished without much difficulty, on the
spot ideological campaigns and extreme repositioning of troops. As a result, in the
subsequent months it seems the CCP and CMC began to take the importance of
having a firm control over the military extremely seriously once again. While the
Deng era military reforms had successfully weakened the PLA's political power to a
point where it could no longer challenge the central leadership, it now became clear
that the ruling party still had to resolutely command PLA loyalty. The 1989
Tiananmen military intervention marked a turning point in attention given to the
PLA. Effectively the incident reversing the trend that had begun in 1979. Several
factors coalesced at roughly the same time to bring about the well funded, rapidly
modernizing and important PLA now visible in China. First, as discussed, the
importance ofPLA loyalty as the final line of party defense was violently
149 Saich 2001, p. 193.
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demonstrated. Thus, immediately following the events a large and prominent
propaganda campaign began to stress the army's absolute loyalty to the party.
"...Reassertion of political criteria emphasizing the PLAts 'absolute loyalty' to the
CCP followed the Tiananmen crisis of 1989. The need for this effort stemmed from
evident vacillation and resistance on the part of some PLA units to the orders to
intervene in the martial law period, and especially the order to clear the Square by
force.,,15o These reforms to PLA political training and policy then became long-term
official mandates. " ...A conference on PLA political work, convened in December
1989, was addressed by General Political Department director Yang Baibing who
endorsed a new program of political indoctrination stressing the PLA's 'absolute
loyalty' to the party."151 Indeed, the assertion and stress of presenting the PLA's
absolute loyalty to the central party, both within and outside the army, became one
longstanding reform resulting from the 1989 Tiananmen incident. "Throughout the
1990's and on into this decade, even while the observance of political criteria has
seemed more and more perfunctory alongside an increasingly powerful stress on
substantive technological expertise, commentary in the PLA Daily and leadership
statements and speeches on Army Day and other military occasions have continued
to dwell on this and related themes."152 This message is seen prominently today, and
indeed may be one of the first images a casual observer of the PLA might notice.
Indeed, the ideological campaign stressing PLA party loyalty that developed after the
150 David M. Finkelstein and Kristen Gunnes (ed), Civil-military Relations in Today's China, (M. E.
Sharp, 2006), 135.
151 Finkelstein et a12006, p. 136.
152 Finkelstein et a12006, p. 136.
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1989 events in Beijing became a permanent aspect of the PLA mandate.
Second, beginning in 1989 and continuing to this day, the PLA's military
budget was raised steadily. Further, the new General Secretary to the Communist
Party of China, Jiang Zemin, had no personal military service background.
Previously, all others General Secretaries had served in the military and had personal
connections with many of the top generals. Jiang had none. This, coupled with the
dramatic demonstration of the army's importance, helped convince him to value an
increased military budget, modernization efforts and prestige. " ...Jiang Zemin's
taking over the helm of the military in 1989 also accounts for some of this increase in
PLA budgets. Where Deng could command the PLA, Jiang could not. Having never
spent a day in the military, Jiang embarked on assiduous efforts to cultivate PLA
loyalty, and an increased budget was part ofthis effort."153 Third, the United States'
first Gulf War presented another incentive for Chinese military modernization. The
antiquated PLA's military model operated much like that of the Iraqi army.
Theoretical debates had been raging in PLA circles and military academies regarding
a contemporary 'people's war' and it's ability to resist the full force of a modem
military. The United States' dramatic victory shocked many. "The falling [budget]
trend was probably reversed after the 1990-91 Gulf War. The high-tech weapons
used in the war served as a wake-up call to the Chinese military leadership,
reminding them how far China was behind in its armaments.,,154
153 Finkelstein et a12006, p. 203.
154 Shaoguang Wang, The Military Expenditure afChina, 1989-1998 (Department of Political
Science, Yale University, 1999) http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/gpa/wang_files/Milex.pdf(accessed
November 8, 2008).
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CHAPTER VI
MISSION OF THE MODERN PLA
"Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive one; it is
man and not materials that counts." Mao Zedong
Mao, writing in the grips of war against both Japanese and Kuomintang
forces, sought to highlight the power of a populace mobilized against a common
enemy who was relying upon determination and numbers to defeat better equipped
opponents. Since unification, China has struggled to define the evolving role between
man and material. Theoretical debates have raged. Should the PLA remain 'red,'
focused first on proper political thinking and second on material, or 'expert,'shifting
primary focus to military professionalism? In 1991, after viewing the decisive U.S.
victory over Iraq's military, a military that in many ways mirrored the contemporary
PLA, China began to concentrate on military modernization with increased efforts.
To achieve rapid modernization a dual 'red' and 'expert' strategy was adopted."155
The proceeding PLA changes, while underway, are not easy for those outside the
inner circles ofthe Politburo or Central Military Committee (CMC) to determine as
China, like any other nation, does not foster transparency in its military process,
planning or goals. The last official report, dating from 1993, titled Military Strategic
Guidelines for the New Period (Xin shiqi junshi zhan1tie fangzhen) stated a variety of
objectives that, while undoubtedly modified by year to year adjustments, represent
155 Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today (Routledge, 2006), 14.
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the last official guidelines by which the CMC and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
operate. This report highlighted the need for forces capable of conducting
amphibious and airborne operations against Taiwan.
Indeed, during the 1990s and early 2000s Taiwan became a central issue
driving PLA modernization. After U.S. intervention during the 1996 Taiwan Strait
crisis, it became increasingly clear to the CMC and PLA leadership that militarily
intimidating Taiwan, and its U.S. ally, would require a highly developed and
technologically advanced army, a force capable of operating across spacial distances
and neutralizing both Taiwanese and U.S military deterrents. As a result, increased
effort, resources and money were invested into developing the PLA navy and air
force (PLAN and PLAAF). Since then, overt tension over Taiwan has temporarily
faded as economic ties have strengthened; the pro-independence movement in
Taiwan has lost popularity in Taiwan and the Chinese central government's perceived
need to prevent immediate political separation has eased considerab1y.156
The lessening of immediate tensions should not suggest that the Chinese
central government dismissed the issue of national reunification. Today, military
modernization and PLA strengthening campaigns continue with showing resolution
towards Taiwan. In a 2007 article carried in major Chinese online newspapers
(Xinhuo and the U.S. ChinaDai1y) Zhang Qinsheng, the officer in charge ofPLA
foreign affairs, said "The modernization of the Chinese armed forces aims to achieve
the ability to defend national sovereignty, security and reunification of the country."
Since the leadership in Beijing still officially regards Taiwan as part of the nation and
156 Political talks between neighbors and joint actions during SARS. (Is this right?)
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asserts matters of diplomacy between the PRC and Taiwan as wholly domestic in
nature, this statement is obviously directed at cross-straits military wrangling.
However, in just the past few years the government directive towards
PLA modernization has become increasingly complicated. While Taiwan remains of
important, new issues, policy goals and tasks assigned to the PLA have grown.
Territorial integrity, a growing reliance on foreign oil and an increasing desire to
secure shipping lanes for supplies are all being identified as potential missions for the
PLA. Additionally, increasing central for developing a military force capable of
mirroring developments in China's civilian sector is visible. This concern was
identified in 1993 as " ...Developing...units and personnel capable of supporting
global exchange programs, lJN peace-keeping operations, and foreign military
training programs."157 While such a trend in PLA modernization is obviously not
new, many attribute the full-fledged rise of this phenomenon to the past several years
alone. "By 2005 a new phrase began to appear in Chinese pronouncements,
proclaiming that China must strive to build 'a military force that is commensurate
with China's ... international status'."158 A year later, a April 2006 commentary in the
official Liberation Army Daily explicitly reiterated this desire, "As China's
comprehensive strength is incrementally mounting and her status keeps on going up
in international affairs, it is a matter of great importance to strive to construct a
military force that is commensurate with China's status and up to the job of
defending the interests of China's development, so as to entrench China's
157 Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell (ed), Right Sizing the PLA (US Government, 2007),213.
158 Kamphausen et a12007, p. 215.
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international status."I59
In realizing these goals the PLA is undergoing fundamental changes to
reorder its fighting force from winning "protracted wars of attrition on its territory to
one capable of fighting and winning short-duration, high intensity conflicts against
high-tech adversaries - which China refers to as "local wars under conditions of
informatization."I6o. In real terms the outcome of this evolving strategy is twofold.
First, winning wars "under conditions ofinformatization" means China is actively
pursuing advanced technology from direct foreign sales, dual-use technologies and its
own civilian sector. Nearly every avenue for procurement of advanced, integrated
and technologically reliant weapons is currently being utilized by the government. A
2007 Xinhua article quoting Hu Jintao explains the goal as, "To continue to
implement the strategy of strengthening the military through science and
technology...the application of information technologies as the driving force and
ensure that our armed forces are capable of winning warfare in the information age."
Second, massive personnel downsizing has occurred for over the past two decades. A
1994 China Daily article explains. "Since the mid-1980s, China has twice downsized
its military by a total of 1.5 million. In September 2003, the Chinese government
decided to further reduce 200,000 troops by the end of 2005 to maintain the size of
the People's Liberation Army (PLA) at 2.3 million." This force restructuring includes
an increased non-commissioned officer corps to soldier ratio, more airmen and more
159 Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power ofthe People's Republic of
China 2007 (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2007)
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/070523-China-Military-Power-fmal.pdf (accessed
November 8, 2008).
160 Department of Defense 2007, p. 1.
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highly skilled technology staff. Currently, the macro PLA strategy is dominated by
these two concurrent trends.
While procuring and developing advanced weapons, weapons systems
and integrated technology required in their operation continues to present China with
domestic, monetary and foreign policy problems, the PLA is steadily modernizing its
equipment and strategic involvement into intelligence and high-end technology.
Ironically, while massive personnel downsizing is underway, the PLA is once more
faced with questions of recruitment, popular perception and securing the right kind of
soldier. As always, the conditions of the time dictate the specifics of the desired PLA
soldier. In the 1990s, CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin said, "we must train qualified
personnel first, for we would rather let our qualified personnel wait for equipment
than the other way round. II 161 Thus it would seem Mao's old military doctrine holds
true. China, while actively pursuing advanced military materiel, is finding its army is
only as good as its soldiers. The rapidly unfolding story of PLA modernization is, in
large part, a story of finding highly educated, skilled and technology savvy youth to
become officers capable of operating and developing a growing supply of high-end
technology now found in the PLA. However this task is proving a challenge for
China's central leadership. The following pages will explore the dynamic between
evolving Chinese civil-military relations, contemporary civilian PLA perceptions and
what the Chinese central leadership is doing to change, manipulate and guide them.
161 Dennis J. Blasko, "Chinese Military Logistics: The GAD System Part II", China Brief, October
14, 2004, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?
volume_id=395&issue_id=31 08&artic1e_id=2368693 (accessed November 8, 2008).
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CHAPTER VII
THE MODERN PLAtS TROUBLE FINDING THE RIGHT PEOPLE
Today, the image of the PLA is hampered in a number of ways. First,
since the PLA's founding in 1927 it has found the need to engage in production,
agriculture and businesses with the civilian economy. During the pre-unification
armed conflict these practices simply served to repay civilians or provide soldiers
with food and equipment. Later, Maoist and communist campaigns required the PLA
to serve as a shining example of hard work and diligence. " ...The involvement of the
military in economic affairs is nothing new. It began in the early days of the Red
Army, expanded during the revolutionary period, and continued, with widely varying
intensity, after the establishment of the Communist regime."162 However, in the post-
Mao era and Deng's reforms the PLA's internal production and economic
participation took on an entirely new dimension. During the 1980's the PLA was
freed to engage in pure market capitalism. "The Deng leadership cast off Maoist
restrains on economic development, the PLA began to move into commercial
activities that would have been strictly off-limits."163 Using its resources, manpower
and official position, the PLA began doing extremely well for itself. Indeed, many
members of the armed forces faced with falling paychecks, decreased military budget
162 Thomas 1. Bickford. "The Chinese Military and Its Business Operations: The PLA as
Entrepreneur," Asian Survey, Vol. 34, May 1994, http://wwwjstor.org/stable/2645058 (accessed
November 17, 2008).
163 Bickford 1994, p. 11.
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and memories of the eventual humiliation ending the Cultural Revolution began
using these advantages illegally. "...The assets readily available to PLA units to take
on economic undertakings; and the desire of officers and men to make up for past
deprivations ... The result has been a wide range of activities that are downright
illegal.,,164 Stories ofPLA corruption, bribery, prostitution, arms smuggling and the
use of government property for private business ventures all became extremely
common during this period.
Indeed, such PLA practices occurred throughout the entire 1980's. At one
point it was estimated that a full ten percent of the PLA's then five million strong
standing force was directly engaged in the civilian economy. PLA business
interactions even became a course taught at some military academies. 165 These
activities, and commonplace excesses, eventually carne under direct criticism from
the central communist party. In 1989, following Tiananrnen Square and the massive
reforms designed to repair the PLA's image, a number of regulations were issued by
the central leadership to curtail illegal business practices. The list was soon referred
to as the "ten nos." While some 'nos' were fairly straightforward, the regulations
themselves clearly illustrate the depths of illegality the PLA had corne to. Some, but
not all, of the regulations include .... "[No] buying up goods illegally, engaging in
profiteering, smuggling, hiring out or selling military vehicles and exploiting the
164 Bickford 1994, p. 23.
165 Mel Gurtov. "Swords into Market Shares: China's Conversion of Military Industry to
Civilian Production," The China Quarterly, Vol. 134, June 1993,http://wwwjstor.org/stable/654300
(accessed November 17, 2008).
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positions of military men for business purposes."166 Unfortunately for the PLA's
image such reforms did not immediately work.
As a result of negative civilian attention and the central leadership's
regulations the early 1990's saw the PLA itself began taking steps to lessen the
negative attention it was starting to receive.
The problem of corruption and the prospect of the PLA
engaging in something as blatantly capitalistic as
currency futures or living high off the profits of their
corporations is not something the military leadership
welcomes; concerns have been raised about the PLA's
image, especially when military units use their own
names in doing business.General Liu Huaqing, vice
chairman of the Central Military commission, has been
very strong in his warnings about the negative impact of
corruption in the PLA, particularly during the anti-
corruption drive in 1993. 167
These reforms did not immediately work to fix the PLAts tarnished
Image.
Many Western observers in the early 1990's claimed the PLA, which had once stood
for high ideals and purity, had become a shining example of Chinese capitalism gone
wrong. "If the PLA was once a symbol of revolutionary purity, it is now more a
symbol of marketization and materialism."168 The problems of corruption continued
until 1998 when the Chinese central leadership decided it could no longer stand for
the PLA directly engaging in the civilian economy. " ...This foray into business for
profit spawned deep levels of corruption in the system, leading the civilian leadership
166 Bickford 1994, p. 24.
167 Bickford 1994, p. 460.
168 Bickford 1994, p. 461.
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to order the PLA to divest its commercial operations in 1998."169 The announcement
not only called for a radical deviation from standard PLA practices, but in a political
move unseen in the waning days of the Cultural Revolution the central leadership
openly and scathingly attacked the military for its practices. "This announcement,
which was unprecedented in its public airing and the severity of the language used,
was seconded in subsequent days by key members of the military and civilian
leadership, including the de facto head of the PLA, General Zhang Wannian."170 This
move was meant to end the PLA market economy interaction forever, warn against
future enterprises and show the general population that such corruption would not be
tolerated.
Yet, it seems the long standing institutions formed over a decade in the
1980s, based on practices established from before the PRC won formal sovereignty,
are hard to fully eradicate. While complete separation of the army from the economy
has so far proved impossible, the widespread and endemic profiteering has largely
ceased. "The widespread conclusion that the PLA was "banned" from business is far
too simplistic. The military continues to operate a wide variety of small-scale
enterprises and agriculture units... No longer, however, will profit and international
trade be critical features in the system."l7l While past practices that served to severely
damage the PLAts image among civilians have largely stopped, the central leadership
still finds it necessary to occasionally remind the PLA, and civilians, that the
169 Finkelstein et al 2006, p. 214.
170 Finkelstein et al 2006, p. 224.
171 Finkelstein et al 2006, p. 230.
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continuation of past predatory market practices will no longer be tolerated. "The
years following the divestiture have been marked by repeated "mop-up" campaigns
on the part of the centra11eadership and significant resistance and foot-dragging on
the part of local government and military officials, repeating the pattern of earlier
rectifications."172 In recent years the PLA has been ordered to begin divesting itself
from providing non-military services to its own members, and instead rely on the
civilian economy. One 2007 Xinhua article titled "PLA to cut non-military projects
and services." explains "The People's Liberation Army (PLA) plans to withdraw its
involvement in transport, electric power and telecommunication projects and stop
providing non-essential services to its members, according to a circular issued
recently by the Central Military Commission." Overcoming the negative attention
and imagery the PLA received during its years of overt market interaction has not
been easy, and internal debates still rage over exactly how much the PLA still owns.
As a career choice for young educated Chinese the PLA also faces a
number of problems. In the middle of 2000, the PLA Daily (Chinese) published an
article describing a youth from Ningbo, a rather affluent port city, who fabricated a
criminal record, including drug addiction and murder. When discovered, the youth
said 'I would rather spend four years in prison than three in the army.' This story
became rather infamous, and while conditions for PLA recruitment have no doubt
improved in the better part of a decade, the situation is still, in many ways, extremely
grim. In a 2006 PLA 'self assessment', among five key issues facing the PLA "The
gap between the current level (of soldiers and officers) and the requirements that
172 Finkelstein et al 2006, p. 230.
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must be met in order to win wars" was identified as a key problem."]?3 One PLA
Admiral, Shi Yunsheng, is quoted in a 2007 brief before the Chinese Central
Congress as describing the situation as, "Those that we need will not come or will not
stay. Those we do not need will not go away."174 Thus, while the Ningbo youth is no
doubt an extreme example, the basic conditions that would lead someone to prefer
prison to PLA service are still present. Contemporary observers of China know the
entire nation is undergoing profound changes at nearly every level of society. The
PLA does not act within a vacuum separated from society. This is especially true
when they must recruit new members from today's youth. Understanding why the
contemporary PLA faces such a negative stigma is intimately linked to a rapidly
modernizing civilian economy and culture. Currently, three primary factors create
difficulties in finding the right personnel for the PLA. First, China's one-child policy
and a rapidly aging population has large and wide-scale ramifications on youth
demographics that tend toward lowering the desirability of a career in the PLA.
These changes are being met with new recruitment laws, which often solve one
problem while creating another. Second, institutionalized problems in the education
system are compounded by massive disparities between urban and rural schooling
that create great difficulties in finding enough qualified youths. Third, the rapidly
expanding civilian economy, while critical in providing weapons technology and
funds, is increasingly drawing the best youths away from the PLA, as those with
173 Karl Eikenberry, US.-China Military Relations: Engaging the PLA (Roundtable Meeting, US-
China Roundtable, 1999),82.
174 Timothy Lo, "PLA Reform," Coping with the Dragon, 2007,
http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/pubs/CopingwithDragon.pdf (accessed November 8, 2008).
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advanced degrees can find much better paying opportunities in the civilian economy.
China's 1979 one-child policy has had enormous and far-reaching effects
on population demographics, ratios and interactions. This has created societal
repercussions at nearly every level and aspect of Chinese family interactions, politics
and government. For the purpose of the PLA, which despite widespread numerical
force reductions is still in the business of recruitment, vast numbers of young
(primarily men) people every year creates special problems. First, and most simply,
one child per family (generally) means that fewer youth exist in Chinese society, and
thus fewer are available for recruitment. Western military observers have already
noted this trend. "The broad shifts taking place in China's population...are working
against the PLA.,,175 The numerical shortcoming is no secret within the PLA either.
A 2001 PLA Daily article reported that the number of recruitable males in one eastern
province had shrunk from 2 million in 1991 to less than 1 million in 2001. 176
Decreased birth rates are thus resulting in a population that is
disproportionately old. Indeed, many population experts expect that China will be the
first nation to ever become 'old before it gets rich.' Again, this is no secret in China.
"Chen Zhi, chief of the department of population and social science in Sichuan
Province which has the highest proportion of seniors in China said 'Weare like a man
getting old before he gets rich,' Chen recently told the local press.,,177 The shortage of
175 Finkelstein et a12006, p. 242.
176 Finkelstein et a12006, p. 242.
177 Jehangir S. Pocha, "The Greying of China," The Boston Globe, January 2,2007
http://www.boston.comlnews/world/asia/artic1es/2007/01 /02/the_graying_oCchina/ (accessed
November 8, 2008).
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youth combined with an aging population is thus beginning to affect the traditional
family structure that relied on the children to take care of elderly parents. Just as in
years past, having the only son leave the family is a large social obstacle. As a result,
the PLA has recently lowered its term of service from four to two years considering.
"...the hardship placed on some families who had only one son (as a result of the one-
child policy), the decision was made to reduce the time of conscription service in
order to allow the youth to return to their families quicker."178 Yet, while many felt
the need to reduce the term of service to help alleviate social-family pressures, the
new recruitment laws in many ways only serve to compound the existing problem. In
a system that has trouble finding enough male recruits, reducing terms of service by
half simply means twice as many new recruits must be found and trained. "The
paradox is evident: to make the service more palatable to a small group of candidates,
the term of service had to be shorted ... created a requirement for a greater number of
conscripts to be drawn each year from an ever- shrinking pool."179 Thus, while the
problem of losing sole-family supports is reduced, the underlying need to find more
youth from a smaller pool is doubled.
Finally, social stigmas and male child desirability has led to an increasing
gender imbalance. "In China, which has strict population controls, boy children are
thought to be more desirable to parents than girl children. The ratio of boys to girls in
China...has been widening in the past decade due to techniques that allow parents to
178 Blasko 2006, p. 49.
179 Finkelstein et al 2006, p. 242.
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predict the sex of their offspring."18o In 2001 this had created a sex ratio of 1: 17, or,
in gross numerical terms, "The number of men is thought to outnumber women in
China by more than 60 million."181 At first glance this might seem like good news for
the PLA which is, primarily, recruiting young males. However, like most broad-
reaching social trends, the growing youth gender imbalance has created a
phenomenon among young men in China known as 'unrnarriageable males.' China's
"unmarriageable males" are "the rising numbers of young men in China who, due to
the country's growing youth gender imbalance, have no realistic prospect of securing
a bride.,,182 The fear among these young male soldiers, many who do not have
girlfriends when they join the ranks, is that they simply will not find a bride once
they leave the service. This fear has been noted within the PLA as well. "Lt. General
Qin Chaoying said that many conscripts did not have a girlfriend back home during
their service and, afraid of becoming "unmarriageable males," many ofthem want to
leave the service.,,183 Thus, the effects of the one-child policy are profound in finding
and recruiting youth for the PLA. In many ways they do present any special
differentiation between educated and uneducated youth in terms of the desirability of
a career in the PLA, but they do strongly compound the problems facing current
recruitment.
180 Bashir Mamdani and Meenal Mamdani, The Impact o/China's one-child Policy (Indian Journal of
Medical Ethics, 2006), http://www.issuesinmedicalethics.org/143ss106.html (accessed November
8,2008).
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182 Charles Wolf, Jr., K. C. Yeh, Benjamin Zycher, Nicholas Eberstadt, Sungho Lee, Fault Lines in
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183 Finkelstein et al 2006, p. 31.
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While demographic shifts driven by the one-child policy may not have
specific implications for educated youth joining the PLA, the current educational
structure that exists in rural, urban and military academies is currently working
almost perfectly against the needs of the modem PLA. Every year the CMC
publishes a list regarding the number of candidates they need from each militarily
autonomous region in China. This forced conscription, supplemented by volunteers
from around the country, makes up the regular recruits entering PLA force. These
conscription numbers are assigned quotas and reflect the population ratio of rural and
urban China. Currently these figures are set at 66.8 percent and 33.2 percent
respectively. Recruitment is based on a strict percentage based on populations ratios
for a number of reasons. Politically, burdening the respective populations evenly
makes a great deal of sense and helps foster a sense of fairness in the system.
Ideologically, the basic concept of a two-to-one rural/urban split is supported by the
PLA's historic reliance on the strong rural youth.
However, in modem times, when education is ofparamount importance,
this dynamic is creating increased problems in securing qualified recruits. Current
nation-wide compulsory education laws require access to nine years ofeducation for
all Chinese youths. However, the 1978 market reforms have consistently favored
urban development, fueled by a large-scale influx of unequally educated workers
from the countryside. Rural education is not heavily (sometimes at all) subsidized by
the central government. Thus, the poorest Chinese are often left to supply their
education bill entirely on their own. Not surprisingly, rural education is sparsely
subsidized, especially when compared to standards in the largest cities. "Although
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twelve years of schooling was virtually universalized in Beijing and Shanghai by the
beginning of the twenty-first century, 20 percent ofthe country's populated rural
areas had not attained the legally guaranteed nine years of education."184 By 2005 this
figure had dropped to ten percent receiving nine years of education or less. For the
PLA who still draws, by law, a full two-thirds of its recruits from rural areas, finding
youths capable of becoming the new generation of qualified soldiers needed by the
work force is extremely difficult.
Another consequence of rural educational inequities is a steady flow of
rural youth without professional training pouring into cities looking for any kind of
employment combined with the household registration act which prevents rural
families from participating in state-owned enterprises and party institutions.
However, current registration laws require PLA recruitment be conducted on location
of one's official registration of residence. A youth who travels to the city is often
unavailable for the following winter conscription. Given the burden oflow-standard
local infrastructure for many rural communities, tracking the exact whereabouts of
every member is not a high priority."18s Thus, when winter recruitment and
registration arrives, officers in charge are often forced to lower educational standards
as the quota system overestimates both the number of youths in the community and
their educational level. A 2006 Xinhua article sheds some light on this issue, stating
'For those from rural areas, elementary education is a must. 186 Close observers will
184 Gerard A. Postiglione, Education and Social Change in China: Inequality in a Market Economy
(M. E. Sharp, 2006), 3.
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note elementary education is six years - a full three years short of the 'national
compulsory level'.
Urban education is in many ways the polar opposite of the dilemma faced
by rural recruitment. The same policies that have disproportionately burdened rural
communities have helped fuel a remarkable surge in the level, quality and
universality of urban education. The same Xinhua article quoted above describes this
phenomenon stating, "Urban male recruits have at least high school education and
university students are favored." Clearly, the laws surrounding PLA recruitment and
conscription from urban areas reflect a much brighter intellectual prospect. However,
even at the constrained one-third yearly urban recruitment levels, the PLA is still
facing a difficult task in finding enough urban youths for the PLA. The current
conscription laws begin at age 18 and cap at age 22, while compulsory enlistment is
deferrable to those currently studying at university level institutions. Thus, in
practical terms, for the vast majority of university level students - predominately
urban youth - mandatory conscription is not something they will ever face. 187 This
condition is good for the students, but bad for the PLA. Additionally, higher
education enrollment has received much attention from the central government.
Educational reforms have been underway since the end of the Cultural Revolution's
end and, for the most part, they have been tremendously effective. Since 1978 "the
number of new students in the higher education system has increased over ten-fold,
November 1, 2006 http://news3.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-11/01/content_5275743 .htm
(accessed November 8, 2008).
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79
from about 400,000 in 1978 to nearly 4.5 million in 2004."188 This surge in
enrollment has not only affected the pool of urban youths, but also the most highly
educated and intellectually- minded rural youths have increasingly found opportunity
for higher education. While this is an extremely positive development for both the
economic prospect of China and Chinese youth wishing to pursue higher education,
the modernizing PLA remains unable to rely upon traditional sources of youth
willing to serve.
Finally, the very strength of the civilian economy that is making
technological leaps possible for the PLA is fighting against recruiting those needed to
use the new equipment. While the PLA does not fully publicize their pay scales,
some educated guesses may be made regarding the disparity between contemporary
civilian-military pay.189 In the 1970s, the military paid some twenty percent to thirty
percent more than civilian counterpart jobs. However, these pay scales have not been
matched to civilian progress. In a rare case, a professor at the National Defense
University (he was a senior colonel with thirty years of service) revealed his 1999
salary as 1,600 yuan a month. 190 To put this in perspective, a 2003 graduate of an
ordinary electrical engineering department can now expect to make anywhere from
5,000-10,00 yuan a month working in a large city.191 Such a disparity has created
188 Yitzhak.Shichor, "China's Revolution in Higher Education", China Brief, March 2,2006,
http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?
volume_id=415&issue_id=3637&artic1e_id=2370828 (accessed November 8,2008).
189 Office of Naval Intelligence, China's Navy 2007 (Office of Naval Intelligence, 2007)
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/oni/chinanavy2007.pdfp. 103 (accessed November 8, 2008).
190 Finkelstein et a12006, p. 238.
19lFinkelstein et a12006, p. 180.
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enormous problems for the PLA. A rank few will obtain, senior colonel, in his mid-
fifties would make only a tiny fraction of what a fresh graduate from a top-ranking
technology school could find. This disparity did not function to draw technologically
savvy recruits into the PLA. Thus, in 2006 the PLA begun to address these issues by
nearly doubling pay for officers and NCO's. "PLA officers and NCOs received pay
increases ranging between 80 and 100 percent. For example, prior to the 2006 salary
increase, a PLA colonel earned 2,000 RMB (USD 256) per month. Following the
salary increase, a PLA colonel now earns 4,200 RMB (USD 539) per month."I92
These reforms were also matched by increased care to barracks, food and basic living
standards.
However, despite these reforms, the pay disparity is still quite evident.
Even with the raises, the civilian economy still offers more money and fast
promotions at a younger age to recruits with the degrees now being sought after.
Even after the pay reforms the income inequality between soldiers and those engaged
in the civilian economy is still being noted, both in domestic Chinese sources and by
foreign observers. A Xinhua article published November 30, 2007 detailed the
monetary and employment benefits of graduating from a top university, in this case
Peking University. The article noted that 97% of their graduates find employment
within a year, with most working for famous multinational companies, major
organizations or prominent research institutes. However, the article went on to say
that "Ten percent chose to work in the impoverished areas in northwest China, the
192 Roy Kamphausen, Andrew Scobell, Travis Tanner (ed), The "People" in the PLA (US
Government, 2008), 212.
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People's Liberation Anny (PLA), or the rural areas around Beijing."193
This ten percent subcategory was defined as "rewarding, but does not pay wel1."
Chinese officials and PLA generals still complain that wages, as they stand, still can
not compete against the civilian economy to attract the best and the brightest Chinese
youth. "Senior Chinese officers have complained in interviews in the local and
foreign media that PLA pay rates were still too low to entice the best recruits despite
the continued increases in defense outlays. The market economy is also attracting a
lot of talented graduates to join the private sector. II 194 Today's most contemporary US
research regarding the PLA reaches the same conclusions as Chinese sources. The
September, 2008 "The "People" In The PLA: Recruitment, Training, and Education
in China's Military claims "However, the PLA has been facing increased
competition for top university graduates from China's private sector, and this is likely
to become more of a challenge as the economy continues to grow and the highly
educated graduates the PLA seeks to recruit look to more lucrative options.,,195 The
problem is quite simple. The PLA, despite recent pay increases still can not compete
monetarily with the booming civilian economy for candidates with technology
degrees from its best universities.
Thus, today the PLA is faced with a paradox. Blazing economic
modernizations have provided capital, technology and incentive to modernize the
193 editor, "Survey: Graduates from famous universities get a head start in jobs game," Xinhua
English, November 30, 2007 http://news.xinhuanet.com/eng1ish/2007-11/30/content_7175059.htm
(accessed November 8, 2008).
194 David Lague, "China investing heavily to train a more tech-savvy army," New York Times Herald
Tribune, May 29,2007, http://www.iht.com/artic1esI2007/05129/asia/china.php (accessed
November 8, 2008).
195 Kamphausen et al2008, p. 196.
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PLA. However, this very system that has made such progress possible works against
the PLA's ability to find the kind of people who can actually use these new
technologies. These modernizations, and the resultant problem of finding the right
kind of recruit, are being taken seriously by the CMC, and Chinese central
leadership. Today the PLA is at the forefront of a Chinese movement to address
these issues, and a foreign movement to study the handling of these issues. One
contemporary way these challenges to recruitment are being aggressively met is with
propaganda. To date, little foreign research has explicitly dealt with modem PLA
recruitment and contemporary propaganda. Yet, similar to the mobilization for the
Korean war, a wide campaign currently aims to make the right kind of youths desire
enlistment and generalized Chinese society to view the PLA as positively as possible.
Though the target audience is different, media and social institutions are different,
the basic tool to alter perception remains constant.
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CHAPTER VIII
MODERN PRO-PLA PROPAGANDA
Given the seriousness of the recruitment issues, and the modem focus on
Chinese military improvements, current efforts to bolster the PLA's image are
widespread, diverse and well-propagated within Chinese society. They stem not only
from the central Government, but in addition, modem, positive-PLA motifs are
finding home in popular media created and viewed by private citizens. However,
despite the widespread nature and diverse sources, modem media, images and
propaganda glorifying the PLA can be grouped into three distinct categories. The first
category presents the need for a strong, modem PLA, and the great achievements
currently being made towards that end. Following this, much effort is being made to
highlight PLA heroes and popularize individuals. This is also finding roots in modem
China's popular entertainments and its portrayal ofPLA soldiers. Finally, in keeping
with the PLA's founding as a peoples army that helped harvest crops and safeguard
the commoners, the PLA is increasingly stepping up its disaster relief efforts. This
effort is twofold. First, increased resources and training are being dedicated to
domestic humanitarian missions, increasingly advertising the PLA's role in these
missions. This is then followed by a highly effective and widespread campaign to
portray and publicize these efforts.
Currently much scholarly attention, both Western and Chinese, is being
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given to modem China's development and nationalism. Not surprisingly
contemporary nationalism has strong implications for the PLA as it represents a very
real physical manifestation ofthe nation's power. In recent years the PLA itselfhas
begun to channel the widespread Chinese nationalism internally, an effort that is
being noted. " ...nationalism is a growing force within Chinese society as a whole and
the PLA in particular."196 As for the purpose of increasing the PLA's image in
contemporary society, nationalism has the strong potential to draw recruits by non-
material means. Again, the incredible potential modem Chinese nationalism has for
creating a strong recruitment tool is being taken seriously. "...the strong sense of
nationalism that exists in China can also be a powerful recruiting too1."197
New recruits however, are not the only target used to promote
nationalism and pro-PLA sentiments are being used. Another manifestation of the
PLA, CMC and Chinese central government's manipulation of the armies image is
contemporary nationalism being harnessed to explain why a strong PLA is needed for
China and how the PLA is rising to that challenge. Currently, this message is being
delivered in a multitude of ways. First, and not surprisingly, newspapers such as
Xinhua carry stories that exemplify the need for the PLA. These stories often quote
top CCP leadership, Hu Jintao included. One of many examples, carried the headline
Hu highlights importance ofmilitary training in peacetime. The article goes on to
describe the importance of a strong army, the need for the Chinese people to support
modernization efforts and for the PLA servicemen to remember their historic and
196 Blasko 2006, p. 172.
197 Finkelstein et al 2006, p. 181.
85
important role. "All service people should be made aware of the Army's historic
mission, ideology, fighting spirits, and socialist ethics, while upholding the Marxist
view of war, patriotism and revolutionary heroism, the leader said."198
However, displays and opportunities to detail the need for a strong PLA
are not limited to simple newspaper stories. August 1,2007 marked the official '80 th
Anniversary of the PLA,' an event that was widely covered on Chinese television.
This ceremony even took the central government's approach to stories deemed
important, and blocked out nearly all other channels to cover the anniversary for
several hours. Amid the the speeches, parades and displays, one PLA general came
on and made a long speech regarding the territorial integrity of China - meaning
Taiwan - and other separation movements. Amid such talk he urged the PLA and
Chinese in general to take seriously the problems of military modernization and the
potential for real combat. " ...all PLA soldiers and officers should further "heighten
their sense of responsibility and sense of urgency", and to make all-out efforts to "get
well-prepared for military strugg1e."199 Transcripts of this speech can still be found on
line at the PLA's 80 th Anniversary web page.
While such widespread and broadly decimated stories, images and
messages are no doubt powerful tools in creating and fostering pro-PLA sentiments,
and perhaps even nationalism, modem Chinese leadership is taking steps on diverse
198 Chen Fen (ed), "Hu Highlights Importance of military training in peacetime," Xinhua English,
June 27, 2006 http://news3.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-06/27/content_4757830.htrn (accessed
November 9, 2008).
199 Mu Xuequan (ed), "General stresses PLA's mission to safeguard national sovereignty," Embassy
a/the People's Republic a/China in Australia, March 6, 2007 http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/
t30l488.htrn (accessed November 9, 2008).
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levels to ensure the PLA is well received. Today, the Chinese education system is
also being actively used in efforts to explain why China needs an active and powerful
military, and how the PLA is that force. To this end a strong, compulsory, military
education that focuses on proper military thinking is currently conducted at virtually
all levels of the Chinese education system. This has been written into the Chinese
constitution. In 2001, sponsored by Jiang Zemin, China passed the Law ofthe
People's Republic ofChina on National Defense Education (Order ofthe President
No. 52). The law is extremely clear in its use of schools to foster a sense of
nationalism, pride in China and faith in the PLA. Article one, Section one states
"This Law is enacted in accordance with the National Defense Law and the
Education Law for the purpose ofpopularizing and strengthening education in
national defense, carrying forward the spirit ofpatriotism, promoting the building of
national defense and furthering socialist cultural and ethical progress." The law goes
on to stipulate that "The State, through conducting education in national defense,
helps citizens...develop patriotic enthusiasm and conscientiously perform their
obligations to defend the country." Such regulations are not going unfulfilled. One
example ofmodem political and pro-PLA education can been in an October 27,2007
Xinhua article titled Jet fighter presented to SW China middle school, that details
how a retired PLA jet has been moved to a middle-school as playground object to
teach the children how advanced the PLA has become. The article also details how
excited the children were the night before the aircraft arrived, and how oveJjoyed
they became once it did arrive. "Many students didn't sleep well during night before
the aircraft arrived as they were so excited. When they were informed the plane had
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been sent to school the next day, students rushed to the playground, and touched it.
Some of them even climbed onto it after teachers approved it."200
Modem pro-PLA propaganda is also finding root in institutions of higher
education. The first steps to having PLA education and representation in Chinese
colleges was accomplished in 1998 with the founding of agreements between the
PLA and Peking University and Qinghua University in Beijing allowing PLA
soldiers to directly enroll in the schools and receive education. "The first agreement
between the PLA and a civilian academic institution was signed in July 1998 between
the General Political Department and Peking and Qinghua universities."201 These
agreement has subsequently been expanded to include a total of twenty-one civilian
universities. This initial PLA-Civilian higher education interaction has been
reinforced by efforts to reach the broader student body. Today, officers exist in all
twenty-one universities to further pro-PLA education. "These officers responsibilities
also include overseeing military propaganda work at the host civilian institution... ''202
Today, these offices are clearly visible on Chinese campuses. Illustration six and
seven are of summer 2008 signs outside the PLA office inside the Peking University
walls. (Illustration 6). (Illustration 7). This, again, is in accordance with the 2001
Chinese constitutional amendment which further stipulates in Article 16 "Institutions
of education shall incorporate national defense education into their plans for work
200 Song Shutao (ed), "Jet fighter presented to SW China middle school," Xinhua English, September
27, 2007 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-09/27/content_6799399 .htm (accessed
November 9, 2008).
201 Finkelstein et a12006, p. 190.
202 Kamphausen et al 2008, p. 229.
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and teaching and take effective measures to guarantee the quality and results of
national defense education." The PLA office, complete with billboards, in the center
of China's most prestigious university, is a logical extension of such a law.
However, modem propaganda drives are not limited to such subtle and
inconspicuous examples of youthful pro-PLA education. One, somewhat more
obscure, yet fascinating example of this drive to showcase the need for a strong
armed force in hands on youth education is an amusement park roughly two hours
outside of Shanghai, curiously named Oriental Green Boat (dongfang lu zhou*jj~ff.
fit) . Oriental Green Boat consists of two parts, one being a typical amusement park
while the other is a man-made lake with a life-size model US aircraft carrier on one
side and a fortified Taiwan beachhead on the other. Various pieces of retired military
hardware litter the area. Missiles on concrete platforms, a retired squadron of
bombers and even the rusting exoskeleton of an old diesel submarine rest tucked
away behind the model aircraft carrier. The symbolism behind a US aircraft carrier
posed to invade Taiwan is not subtle. Beyond President Clinton sending in the USS
Independence in 1996 to stop PLA missile tests in the Taiwan Straits203 the PRC is
cun'ently lacking in a 'blue water navy' - or the ability to project its forces much into
sea or beyond its borders. (Illustration 8). (Illustration 9). A US aircraft carrier in
such a position creates a idealized fantasy of modem PLA power, but also clearly
reinforces an extremely tangible example of what and why exactly China needs the
PLA strong, both physically and technologically.
203 editor, "Lessons from the March Missile crisis," Taiwan Communique No. 71, June 1996,
http://www.taiwandc.org/twcoml71-no3.htm (accessed November 9, 2008).
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However, highlighting the need for a strong PLA is not left to pure
chance and juxtaposition of images. The aircraft carrier comes complete with retired
PLA soldiers who lead, mostly children, through a tour of three decks decorated with
modem PLA propaganda. (Illustration 10). This is a picture ofthe first floor, where
soldiers explain to the red-caped children the reasons why China has suffered in the
past for lacking a strong military and who stress the importance of contemporary
efforts to become (and remain) militarily powerful. Such messages are repeated in
written plaques across the walls. (Illustration 11).
The message is clear. In the past China did not have the resources or
might or perhaps the will to defend itself and it paid the price at the hands of the
other more developed nations. Now that China is rising in the world the same
mistakes must not be repeated. This sign even urges the touring youths to ask
themselves what they can do to aid in their nation's security. The second floor lists in
chronological order all the atrocities, injustices and humiliations committed against
China in the past 200 years, while on the third and final floor, PLA soldiers explain
to the children how important it is to have a strong air force and missile program.
One retired PLA supply truck driver, who was willing to speak with me,
claimed that on some weekends extra volunteers would be brought to the site and a
mock invasion would actually be held by shuttling children over from the boat onto
the beachhead. The exact details of the claim are, sadly, unverifiable, but I was able
to ride a retired amphibious landing craft towards 'Taiwan.' (Illustration 12). The ride
came compete with sound effects and commentary from the driver.
In speaking with Chinese citizens from Peking, Fudan University
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students, Olympic spectators, and a number of security guards, the need for a strong
PLA seems to have become broadly agreed upon in civilian society. The most
prominent and widely accepted (or at least widely told to me) belief is that China
does not, in any way, want war. As such, having a strong army is the only way to
prevent one nation from unfairly engaging in violent military actions against another.
I have personally heard the example of the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan in
proving this assertion many times on many occasions. The claim goes, Iraq and
Afghanistan were militarily weak, so they were invaded without too much concern
from either the US or its allies. If it had been modem China, the argument goes,
nobody would have dared.
Given all the attention and effort given to portray why a strong PLA is so
important, the next logical step on the part of the PLA is to prove just how far they
have come. "...The military seeks to impress the public with its competence and the
security it offers.. .Ifthe PLA can indeed regain the sustained respect of the people, it
will probably have a much easier time recruiting and retaining troopS."Z04 This is
exactly what is currently being done. Obvious examples include newspaper articles
highlighting modem weapons, missile programs, space programs and the new
modem training PLA soldiers obtain. Such images are widespread and, in many
respects, dominate the available media representations of the modem PLA. Most
stories carry vivid, high quality pictures exemplifying the skill, training and
modernization of the PLA. (Illustration 13),z05
204 Finkelstein et al 2006, p. 246.
205 Fan Aifeng (ed), "Officers and men in test confrontation exercise," PLA Daily, October 15,2008,
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Here we see again see allusions to amphibious landings, presumably in
reference to Taiwan. The article explains. "During the exercise, the principles of high
speed, coordination, synchronization and high efficiency were embodied by the
officers and men of the unit, and the troops had been tempered in an all-round way."
However, high tech weapons make up the bulk of these stories often complete with
grandiose claims regarding the ability ofPLA soldiers to use these new advanced
technologies. This article discusses long range mobile missile development systems.
(Illustration 14). The article explains, "Recently, the officers and men of an armored
regiment used their new armaments to carry out live-ammunition fire examination
under scorching sun in northern Fujian Province, and the percentage of hits reached
97%."206
Yet, for all the focus on modem training and high tech weapomy, the
PLA and central government leadership is careful to reinforce the personal ability
and drive of contemporary PLA soldiers. One interesting story discussed how some
soldiers, lacking current active duty responsibilities, took it upon themselves to
develop a new personal physical combat training program "...In light of actual
combat, a group of the Nanjing Military Area Command put its troops through
rigorous training of dangerous and difficult subjects in order to constantly enhance
the combat skills." Again, highly detailed visuals follow. (Illustration 15).207
November 9, 2008).
206 Fan Aifeng (ed), "Officers and men in test confrontation exercise," PLA Daily, October 15,2008,
http://english.pladaily.com.cnlsite2/news-channe1s/2008-101l5/content_1510540.htm (accessed
November 9, 2008).
207 Mo Ruilin, "Building up crack toops through hard training," PLA Daily, October 16, 2008,
http://english.pladaily.com.cnlsite2/news-channels/2008-101l6/content_1512123.htm (accessed
November 9, 2008).
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Such examples of modem PLA competence are not limited to army
publications, but can be found all over Chinese media and publishing. One news
story, run on multiple channels that can now be found all across the Internet on both
Chinese and English websites, is a short video of US marines competing in an
obstacle course against their Chinese counterparts. The reporting is not overly
dismissive of American prowess, but instead stresses the intense training the PLA
soldiers undergo and, of course, the background competition during the dialog shows
a US Marine soundly defeated. (Illustration 16).1°8 Contemporary bookstores also
now carry large sections dedicated to military technology and advancements. This
picture highlights one of several shelves dedicated to modem military and PLA
equipment in a bookstore near Peking University. (Illustration 17). Such topics are
also widely covered in newspaper and magazine stands throughout major cities. Thus
the CMC, PLA and central government is aggressively attempting to channel and
cultivate a growing sense that a strong PLA is needed to keep China safe, and remain
peaceful. This is accomplished through media, education and psychical placement of
pro strong PLA images and iconography, while subsequent movements stress how
strong and capable the PLA has become. Civilian culture has, in places, begun
mirroring this image.
The second element in this widespread movement to popularize the PLA
is a drive to increase the reputation and prestige of heroic individuals. This, in many
ways, ties back to long standing traditions seen in the PLA, be it stories exemplifying
208 editor, "US Marines VS Chinese Marines," YouTube, August 20, 2007, http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=bFoWCbQjwXw (accessed November 9,2008).
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courage in the Korean war or the diary of Lei Feng. Today, such stories are still given
much attention by the central government. Scholarship and PLA studies have noted
this general trend, yet have not greatly examined the nuances. "The General Political
Department wastes no chance to publicize these and many other ancillary areas in
which the Chinese armed forces provide support to the general population or create
pride in the Chinese people. Typical reports range from helping peasants with the
harvest, to saving pandas, to congratulating PLA Olympic medal winners."zo9 Today's
version of PLA hero recognition finds dissemination into greater Chinese society
through many of the same outlets as those of past decades. Currently, modem PLA
heroes and role models are recognized primarily in public places, television programs
and newspapers.
The China People's Revolution Military Museum in Beijing offers
perhaps the clearest example of holding military individuals up to public acclaim.
(Illustration 18). (Illustration 19). This plaque reads 'Model of the Time' (shidai
kaimo a~·{i;1*1l). While such a message in a military museum is perhaps not
entirely surprising, it is noteworthy the sheer prominence the PLA receives in this
and many other similar displays around the museum. Looking at this image, the
observer is left with the distinct impression that the PLA constitutes a great deal of
the most capable, praiseworthy and honorable individuals in China.
This message is not left only to those who tour a military museum.
Recently the central government has begun airing short television shows about
outstanding officers, aimed at a civilian audience. "The PLA propaganda apparatus
209 Blasko 2006, p. 175.
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also has been producing a daily half-hour military news program, aired by China
Central Television (CCTV). This program serves primarily the civilian audience, not
the PLA."210 Through the months of June, July and August 2008, every weekday
night at 8:00 PM a half hour segment would be shown on CCTV channel seven,
interviewing, detailing and describing a member of the PLA who had contributed to
the nation in some exemplary way. During the months following the May 2008
Sichuan earthquake, such reports became dominated by those who had taken part in
the rescue operations. (Illustration 20). (Illustration 21). These are two images from
June 18,2008 and August 11,2008 from the brief biography portion of this show.
These stories come on regularly, and again leave the distinct impression that many of
the best in China are found in the PLA.
Print media is also following the same modem trend in creating heroic
PLA figures. In many ways these stories are most reminiscent of the old style cultural
revolution, and even earlier works. This story, PLA Officer I?riving Force Behind
Snow ReliefEffort, from a February 2008 China Daily article describes in great
length the sheer heroic determination, selflessness and pride in safeguarding China
one officer took during the 2008 winter snow storm. In this example a 53 year old
commissar singlehandedly displayed many of the most common and time-honored
traits of an outstanding PLA role model. A truck driver (Lei Feng died driving a
truck) worked tirelessly for 10 straight days in a snowstorm to keep the road clear -
risking not only sheer exhaustion but real physical danger, because, in his words,
210 Stephen J. Flanagan and Michael E. Marti (ed), The People's Liberation Army and China in
Transition (National Defense University Press, 2003), 82.
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"...the looks of helpless passengers and drivers motivated me. I could not give up as
the Spring Festival was approaching." Indeed, even when some drivers would lose
their tempers with Wei for not working fast enough, he would only grit his teeth,
think of China and the importance of this national celebration, smile and work harder.
Such heroics have apparently earned him high praise from most who know him. But
this humble servant has has his own role models '...many people admire him but Wei,
he has his own idols.' Wei's personal heroes are his own soldiers, who despite
personal sacrifice and the needs of their own families, worked without complaint to
safeguard the people, and so won a tear from Wei. "Sometimes I can't help crying
when thinking about my comrades-in-arms. While they worked with me, their own
families were suffering from power shortages and cold, with some of their family
members in hospitals. But they never said no to the tasks assigned. ,,211 No doubt such
heroics do exist, and Wei probably is, by any measure, a hero. Yet, the reporting of
his actions is laced with meaning, which when taken with the other stories beginning
to appear all throughout centrally propagated media, go far beyond simply honoring
heroes. They serve as positive models to follow, embrace and in many cases emulate.
The very real possibility for emulation is not being left to chance.
Contemporary recruitment efforts tie directly into popular PLA figures who have
become recognized in greater Chinese society. One example of this is a new
generation of ads that have now begun being aired around China. (Illustration 22).
This particular ad was discussed at great length in Beijing Yo·uth Daily (Beiqingwang,
211 Wu Jiao, "PLA officer driving force behind snow relief effort," China Daily, February 19, 2008,
http://chinadaily.com.cnfchina/2008-02/19/content_6464342.htm (accessed November 9, 2008).
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~tw~).212 The Chinese headline reads 'An infusion of quality talent to build an
infonnation-equipped anny,' while the ad itself contains three PLA figures who
gained national recognition. The first is Liwei, China's first astronaut, whose wife is
also a PLA officer. He stands above Fang Yonggang, a naval university professor
who became highly associated with educational campaign in 2007, while the third
individual is Gao Ming, a PKU student who took two years off from his studies to
join the PLA and in doing so, became a youth icon. These three individuals are meant
to exemplify not only popular fame, but the new kind of soldier that a modem PLA
needs. Astronauts, professors and students from China's most famous and prestigious
university are clearly recognizable symbols of education and intellectual capability.
Moreover, they target an urban audience. This message is clear in China as well. The
article from Beijing Youth Daily reads 'Conscription in the city for the first time
through the work of public service announcements published in the mainstream
media.'
Yet is it not only the central government that is beginning to popularize
individual heroes among the PLA. Indeed, this is beginning to resonate in popular
non-government sponsored society. The story of Gao Ming, while later portrayed for
recruitment purposes, was entirely organic and created the 'Gao Ming phenomenon.'
Gao, an honor student at PKU studying in business management, joined the PLA in
December 2005 during the yearly winter recruitment drive. He was the first PKU
undergraduate student to do so. "In 2005, responding to an on-campus anny
212 Yang Liwei 1% 3f1j ff5, "daiyan zhengbing guanggao {-'(; ~ 1iE~ I 'ff" [Conscription advocacy
ads], bei qing wang ~twlm [Beijing Youth Daily] November 2,2007,
http://bjyouth.ynet.com/article.jsp?oid=25047042 (accessed November 9,2008).
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recruitment drive, Gao became the first PKU student to enlist and was honored with a
huge send-off ceremony."213 Gao performed exceptionally well in the PLA, ranking
top in both fitness and intellectual drills. The stories covering him, both civilian and
government alike, also stressed how well-liked he was. Later, his decision and
actions caused a stir among his fellow PKU students. The PKU newspaper covered
Gao extensively, and endorsed him for a number of prestigious honors, while other
Chinese news sources endorsed him for other reasons. Sohu.new ran one October, 03
2007 story honoring Gao in its own way. (Illustration 23)214. This picture came with a
Chinese caption that reads 'You are the most handsome guy at Beijing University.'
(ni shi beida zui shiqi de nan sheng 17J\j&.:lt*:&Y~ec~5'3~.The story ofthis smart,
physically capable young army man was covered at length in multiple sources. The
story of the PKU honor student who joined the PLA became so well-known and
discussed in China that some American publications began covering the story. In the
same month as the Sohu.news story was published, The Weekly Standard ran a
similar story titled China 's New Soldier. 215 This article came to many of the same
conclusions as Chinese sources. Gao has become extremely popular and well-known.
The combination of physical and mental prowess, juxtaposed against the apparent
shocking nature ofa PKU student joining the PLA, had created quite a story.
Gao is not the only PLA-related subject finding its way into a subject for
--------
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the civilian news and entertainment field. PLA related stories are becoming
extremely popular in movies and television shows. (Illustration 24). This picture,
taken June 2008, shows a small portion of the military and war section ofa bookstore
near the PKU campus. I visited this bookstore on a weekly basis for nearly two
months, and this section always had many people looking at the titles. One movie,
Assembly, has become especially popular in China. I have yet to meet an urban
Chinese peer close to my age who is not familiar with the film. Indeed, I talked to
several new Chinese students at the University of Oregon who went to college in
China, and while none wished to be named, all had seen the film and claimed it has
been shown in many campus movie halls around China. In the film a PLA soldier,
Captain Gu Zidi, is given an extremely dangerous mission in a 1948 battle against
Guomindang forces and must wait to hear the assembly call to retreat. He never hears
the call, and sacrifices his entire unit fighting to the death against impossible odds to
fulfill his mission. In the process he transforms a cowardly scholar into a model of
selflessness and heroism. Sadly, all the soldiers except Gu die. Gu goes on to conduct
the same level of heroism in the Korean War, but later finds it nearly impossible to
prove he was the war hero his reputation had built him up to be. The film's second
half details his struggle to find formal recognition for his lost battalion, while taking
care of the scholar's wife who refers to him as 'big brotheL' (Illustration 25).216 What
makes the film remarkable, other than its extreme popularity, is the gritty 'real' nature
the film portrays. Gu is presented as a real person, complete with flaws. War is
216 editor, "jijiehao ~~'5m [The Assembly]," Love HK Film, 2007,
http://www.1ovehkfilm.com/panasia/assembly.htm (accessed November 9,2008).
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terrible and people, even PLA soldiers, die in awful ways. This is portrayed in
graphic detail. Yet, all the while, classic themes are duplicated throughout the film.
Gu, and all the soldiers, fight with single-minded dedication for the good of China.
Heroic sacrifices are obviously highlighted, but also the unit's ability. Later, Gu takes
care of, but never engages in any romantic action with his old soldier's wife.
Eventually Gu vindicates the entire battalion's reputation by finally winning them
formal recognition. Television shows have also begun portraying more violent and
realistic versions ofPLA life, winning large audiences. One recent show, Soldier
Sortie, is rumored to have exceeded the former top-ranking television show in China,
Prison Break. According to a October 26, 2007 Time article, "Soldier Sortie is the
most successful series (even more so than Prison Break, according to an Internet poll)
on Chinese TV at the moment." This show depicts much of the same heroism seen in
the civil and Korean war era dramas, only with contemporary PLA special forces
officers.
Today the PLA, CMC and Chinese Central Government are taking the
the task of creating modem PLA heroes extremely seriously. Indeed, while Chinese
Communist Party has a long tradition of recognizing outstanding individuals in the
PLA, recent years have seen an explosion in the amount of time, attention and
prominence the central government has dedicated to propagating the deeds of heroic
individuals to greater Chinese society. Nearly all forms of media are currently
employed in this effort. Moreover the campaign is beginning to resonate strongly
with civilian popular culture. Contemporary China's television and the movie
entertainment industry is not only following suit in creating extremely popular PLA
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stories, but these stories all support the central party message. The message is clear.
The PLA is full of heroes. This is true ofboth the revolution and Korean war era, but
also of the modem PLA.
The third, and final element ofcontemporary, centrally-propagated
positive images regarding the modem PLA is disaster relief. While the PLA has not
fought a major armed conflict since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war, in recent years it
has been actively and aggressively engaged in domestic aid after natural and man-
made disasters. This is a centrally driven directive, widespread and often concerned
with large scale efforts. According to the English language Gov.cn Chinese
Government's Official Web Portal "The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has
undertaken a range of humanitarian relief missions in disaster-stricken areas overseas
in the past five years... nearly 225,000 military personnel have taken part in rescue
and relief work this year."217 Foreign observers are also beginning to take notice of
these trends. "Every year all elements of the Chinese armed forces ...are involved in
numerous relief operations in response to natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes,
earthquakes and forest fires."218 Indeed, while the PLA has always been concerned
with internal domestic safety, modem trends have seen a noticeable increase in the
time, military resources and manpower dedicated to such tasks (I have yet to see a
female in any PLA disaster relief photo). Beginning in 2002 PLA commanders and
units began thinking of disaster relief as part of an official mandate, and thus began
preparing accordingly. "In 2002, rescue and disaster relief training was incorporated
217 Mu XueQuan, "PLA to intensify disaster relief efforts," Gov.cn, August 14, 2006,
http://english.gov.cn/2006-08/14/content_361421.htm (accessed November 9,2008).
218 Blasko 2006, p. 175.
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for the first time into the army's military training plan. Units from all over the country
now routinely prepare to participate in these operations and have a guideline for
training and evaluation."219
Today's PLA not only dedicates large numbers of human resources
towards relief efforts, but has also become a conduit through which state-sponsored
relief aid flows. The Chinese central government is proud of this, and aggressively
advertises the PLA's role in such domestic humanitarian efforts. One, of many,
examples is a Xinhua article from the 2008 snow storm titled PLA Sends 600,000
plus Quilts, Cotton-padded Coats to Disaster-hit Areas. This article discussed in
some detail the sheer volume of relief items the PLA distributed to needy Chinese
citizens. Such articles also commonly stress the competency of today's PLA in not
only its primacy in carrying out aid, but also the speed at which humanitarian
material is distributed. "[A] senior Colonel in the PLA emergency response leading
group said: "We got a request for help from the State Disaster Relief Commission on
Tuesday, and we got the materials to them ovemight.'I22O These articles often come
with long sets of pictures, illustrating the articles pro-PLA assertions. A photo in the
article depicts a member of the PLA infantry handing out steamed bread rolls to a
young woman and child.
However, the contemporary relief efforts of the PLA are not based
entirely on pure physical and tangible actions. Stories and images, such as handing
219Blasko2006,p.174.
220 Yao Sinay (ed), "PLA sends 600,000 plus quilts, cotton-padded coats to disaster-hit areas,"
Xinhua English, January 30, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-
0l/30/content_7526655.htm (accessed November 9, 2008).
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out blankets and bread during the snow storm, and countless other examples detailing
the good deeds of the PLA, are currently extremely widespread. "Photographs and
reports on PLA medical personnel treating local civilians or soldiers donating blood
are common in Chinese military newspapers. The 2004 Defense White Paper states
'more than 100 military hospitals' have provided support to civilian hospitals in
'remote and less developed area,.,,221 Today, even the PLA's official mandate as a
primary domestic relief agency is wildly advertised. "The Headquarters of the
General Staff and the General Political Department ofthe PLA recently issued a
circular requiring soldiers to help citizens in typhoon-hit areas cope with difficulties.
"Soldiers and armed police should help local officials evacuate and resettle citizens
in typhoon-hit areas, and offer food, potable water, quilt and medicines to victims."222
This story originally ran in Xinhua news, Monday, August 14,2006. It is one of
virtually countless examples of centrally disseminated news sources publishing the
disaster relief work carried out by the PLA.
While the PLA has always been a source of internal disaster relief, and
even with the stepped-up campaign of 2002, the 2008 snow storm and earthquake
have provided the most vivid and widely disseminated examples to date of this new
campaign to bolster the PLA's image. Today an enormous volume ofInternet, print
and broadcast media exists. Contemporary images of soldiers aiding earthquake
victims during the 2008 summer months could be seen virtually everywhere in
Beijing. Some examples include, but are not limited to, ads on bus stops, entire
221 Blasko 2006, p. 173.
222 XueQuan 2008, p. 1.
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sections of bookstores filled with glossy, full color picture books detailing the army's
positive role, television ads, newspapers and even inserts in restaurant booklets.
(Illustration 26). (Illustration 27). (Illustration 28). (Illustration 29).
However, it is not only the enormous dissemination of these images that
makes modem trends in publicizing disaster relief noteworthy. Modem images
portray a highly heroic and positive image of the PLA in acting to help average
Chinese citizens in times of extreme need. Indeed, virtually every image of the PLA
and disaster victims is designed to resonate with strong positive feelings towards a
domestic audience. First, images and stories repeatedly stress the selfless dedication
to the Chinese people displayed by the PLA. hnages ofpersonal sacrifice, pain and
hardship are particularly common. In many cases the soldiers hands, as a primary and
extremely tangible means of giving physical support, are highlighted. One Sichuan
television station reported that soldiers, upon seeing the devastation, and injury and
death, dashed among the ruins and began digging out with their bare hands anyone
with the slightest chance of surviving. "Among the collapsed buildings, soldiers used
their hands to dig out anyone with the slightest chance ofbeing alive."223 During the
previous winter's snow storm, images and descriptions of frostbitten hands were also
extremely common. (Illustration 30).224 This Xinhua picture accompanied a story
with a similar description of personal heroics during the snow storm.
Second, accompanying images of injuries sustained aiding the people, the
223 Liu Yunyun, "The PLA Shoulders the Load," Beijing Review, May 22,2008,
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/quotes/txt/2008-05/23/content_118154.htm (accessed November 9,
2008).
224 photography editor, PLA Daily Photo Gallery, various dates, http://english.chinami1.com.cn/site2/
news-channels/photo-reports/2008-11/09/photo-reports.htm (accessed November 9,2008).
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physical determination of young soldiers is often stressed, especially in visual media,
as in being able to move large objects, clear obstacles or transport huge quantities of
desperately needed goods by the heroic determination shown by the modem PLA..
(Illustration 31).225 (Illustration 32).226 Finally, these descriptions stress the long
hours, the exhausting work, the lack of sleep and food soldiers overcome when
rushing to aid their fellow citizens. The same Sichuan television station reported,
"Due to the high pressure involved in the rescue work, many soldiers had not eaten a
meal through the entire day", adding that civilians, upon seeing the soldiers' hard
work, determination and exhaustion "...even tried giving their food to the soldiers,
telling them they could save more lives if they kept their strength." Of course, the
soldiers are reported as graciously refusing such offers. Accompanying stories
detailing modem soldiers' hard work and hunger in these times of hardship are
images of soldiers collapsed, exhausted and catching a few hours sleep at whatever
working location they are presently deployed. (Illustration 33).227 (Illustration 34).228
In many ways this drive to stress the great care, attention and devotion of
the PLA to the Chinese people simply reflects directly upon its early revolutionary
era founding principles. Images and stories of soldiers hauling injured civilians out of
buildings, handing out blankets and refusing to take food from the people tie
225 Bian Xiezu ~'g:~il, Wenchuan! Wenchuan! Jiangzhen Yiju Zhongguo 1XJ II !1XJ II !~!il~~~ i:j:J 00
[Wenchuan! Wenchuan! Strong Earthquake Casts Doubt on China] (Foreign Language Press,
2008),62.
226 photography editor, PLA Daily Photo Gallely, various dates, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/
news-channels/photo-reportsI2008-11/09/photo-reports.htm (accessed November 9, 2008).
227 Xiezu 'g:~il 2008, p. 34.
228 photography editor, PLA Daily Photo Gallery, various dates, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/
news-channels/photo-reportsI2008-11l09/photo-reports.htm (accessed November 9,2008).
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remarkably well into old army rules such as 'Take not even a needle or thread from
the people" "Speak courteously to the people" and "Help them whenever possible."229
It was, after all, one of the PLA's most basic founding mandates that winning the
revolution required massive popular support from the Chinese people. Today, as a
direct arm of the central Party, it seems only logical that such policies would remain.
Yet, what makes the contemporary images of domestic PLA civilian aid particularly
noteworthy is how closely they tie into traditions many decades old. Today many
examples of a stylistic reconstruction of, perhaps, the utmost pinnacle of Chinese
propaganda exist in PLA images that fit remarkable well well with those from the
Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution eras.
Often the similarities between today's images and those of the 1950s and
1960s exist primarily to reduplicate common, and inspiring themes. These images
correspond with stylistic similarities seen between the two time periods. Artwork and
propaganda from the PRC's early years often highlighted large groups of
hardworking citizens working towards a common goal under a large, waving red flag.
(Illustration 35).230 (Illustration 36).231 The first image is from the cultural revolution,
it depicts members of the PLA and People's Armed Militia engaging in both military
affairs (right half) and domestic industrialization (left half). Both conditions carry a
long line of soldiers beneath the large red flag. The second image is from a long
series of photos from the 2008 winter storm storm. These soldiers are lined up across
229 Graff 2002, p. 235.
230 Landsberger 1994, http://www.iisg.nl/-landsberger/index.html (accessed November 8,2008).
231 photography editor, PLA Daily Photo Gallery, various dates, http://english.chinarni1.com.cn/site2/
news-channels/photo-reports/2008-11/09/photo-reports.htm (accessed November 9, 2008).
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a bridge, shoveling snow towards the center divider in an attempt to clear a driving
space across the impassible corridor. Again, the individuals are obviously
hardworking, but stylistically the images are remarkably similar. Other times, the
style itself bears less resemblance, but the message remains the same ,asserting that
the contemporary PLA cares about the people in many of the same ways seen in
decades past. These images both stem from disastrous earthquakes. (Illustration
37).232 (Illustration 38).233 The first is from 1976, when six large earthquakes
decimated many parts of China; the second is, again, from the 2008 Sichuan
earthquake. While it is unclear if the doctors, or white-capped nurses, have any
formal affiliation with the PLA, both images stress PLA members front and center in
aiding the injured.
Finally, food and agricultural production are finding duplication as well.
(Illustration 39).234 (illustration 40).235 In illustration thirty-nine, a PLA soldier helps
in the Great Leap Forward era land reclamation projects, while the contemporary
image (illustration 40) displays " ...officers and men of a reserve anti-aircraft artillery
division stationed in Sichuan Province seized the opportunity to send some officers
and men to the countryside to help local people to reap wheat."
However, stylistic and single-point similarities are not the only place
where the content of contemporary PLA disaster propaganda is tapping into long-
232 Landsberger 1994, http://www.iisg.nll~landsberger/index.htrnl (accessed November 8, 2008).
233 Xiezu '1j.~J3. 2008, p. 39.
234 Landsberger 1994, http://www.iisg.nll~landsberger/index.htrnl (accessed November 8, 2008).
235 Qiu Chaozhong, "Troops help people in quake-hit areas to harvest wheat," PLA Daily, May 29,
2008, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/special-reportsI2008-05129/content_1287493.htm
(accessed November 9, 2008).
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founded traditions within the anned forces and its interaction with the Chinese
civilian sector. In the recruitment campaign for China's entry into the Korean War,
appeals to national loyalty and filial piety were aggressively made through laws,
social programs and interactions with traditional Chinese society. Today, through its
coverage of disaster relief, the PLA is strongly portrayed as loyal to all of China by
its extreme fIlial piety to the old of the nation. Young children are also brought under
the protection of strong male caregivers. This is accomplished by portraying the
modem PLA as the strong, loyal and pious son. As already seen in descriptions of
PLA heroes' selfless efforts, modem soldiers are reported as putting the nation above
their family life when extreme circumstances call for such sacrifice. Indeed, in the
story of the benevolent commissar, who also rarely saw his wife and child, was
moved to tears thinking of his own men putting the well-being of strangers above that
of their family in an effort to clear the road so that travelers could reach their
destinations in time for the lantern festival.
Such personal heroic sacrifice has been long established in PLA
propaganda, especially in noteworthy individuals selected for special praise. Yet,
what recent PLA visual portrayals from the snowstonn and earthquake add is a
saturation of images that take traditional themes of caring for the elderly and children
to a visual forefront. Pictures depicting young, strong, healthy men showing
dedicated care for children and the elderly dominate depictions from both the 2008
snowstonn and earthquake. (Illustration 41).236 (Illustration 42).237 These images
236 Sun Haibo, "Witness on Site: Journalists Journey Beyond Role as Recorders," China Pictorial
(2008) p. 28.
237 Xiezu ~i£l. 2008, p. 36.
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speak for themselves. Indeed, that is undoubtedly their purpose. These young soldiers
show steadfast devotion to physically caring for elders with whom they presumably
have no family ties. Yet, in these images they act as if every old man or woman were
a close relative. The looks of pious, resolute determination are not coincidental. The
observer of these images is meant to see the PLA as a young, healthy male caretaker
of individuals traditionally looked after by the family. (Illustration 43).238
Children are treated in a similar fashion of heroic responsibility. Great
and tender care is displayed - time and time again. (Illustration 44).239 The rare
depictions of female soldiers presents an opportunity to take the care of children one
step further than is possible with young males. This is one of several images showing
perhaps the most intimate of all care: breasting feeding a young, hungry child. The
article explains how the young woman asked her parents to take care of her own child
for the next six months while she looks after this new child. Such a request radically
inverts a traditional conception of family among the PLA. While the daughter should
be tending to her own family, and raising the grandchildren, she instead has taken it
upon herself to become loyal to the children of the nation at large, asking her own
parents to help shoulder internal family obligations to facilitate this.
What, however, these images lack is depictions of young healthy PLA
soldiers helping young, or even middle aged, Chinese. While they do exist, images of
soldiers aiding young men are extremely rare. It seems unlikely that young men,
238 photography editor, PLA Daily Photo Gallery, various dates, http://english.chinami1.com.cnlsite2/
news-channels/photo-reports/2008-11/09/photo-reports.htm (accessed November 9, 2008).
239 Xiezu ¥~lJ. 2008, p. 46.
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woman or physically capable individuals were not also injured or in need of help in
any of these disasters. Thus, a logical conclusion is that these images are picked
explicitly as appeals to traditional perceptions and roles of the strong family son
piously aiding the family elders to the family elders, looking after the children and
displaying loyalty to the state. (Illustration 45).240
Like other areas ofPLA propaganda, drawing the correlation between the
PLA as the strong, loyal and pious son to the Chinese people is not left entirely to
chance and personal assertion. Contemporary stories describing post-disaster relief
typically stress the great emotional bonds formed between the recipients of PLA aid
and the soldiers themselves. The soldiers are seen as becoming acting members of
what are often newly formed post-disaster communities. Indeed, in the case of the
Sichuan earthquake and its high death toll, many families did become restructured in
various ways. Direct and explicit descriptions of the family-like ties formed by the
PLA are vividly illustrated in a June 5, 2008 article published in the PLA Daily titled
New Family, New Life. This article comes from a special spread to honor PLA
soldiers as part of a larger story dedicated to detailing the PLA front line participation
in relief campaigns that ultimately created a temporary shelter for hundreds left
homeless by the earthquake. Again, written assertions are vividly reinforced by
images of the entire community coming together and crying when the soldiers must
finally depart. (Illustration 46).241 (Illustration 47).242
240 photography editor, PLA Daily Photo Gallery, various dates, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/
news-channels/photo-reports/2008-11109/photo-reports.htm (accessed November 9, 2008).
241 photography editor, PLA Daily Photo Gallery, various dates, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/
news-channels/photo-reports/2008-11/09/photo-reports.htm (accessed November 9, 2008).
242 photography editor, PLA Daily Photo Gallery, various dates, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/
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Finally, centrally disseminated descriptions ofPLA disaster relief stress
how grateful the entire nation is for their dedication, sacrifice and ability. One May
23, 2008 story, published in the Beijing Review, describes how villagers and
townspeople who had been displaced from their homes and cut off from the
surrounding region began to cry with joy and relief when they first saw the soldiers
arrive. " ...many became emotional when they saw the soldiers arrive in town,
shedding tears and saying they were more confident now..."243 The soldiers are
described as not only extremely welcome, but extremely capable and appreciated as
such. Further, following the long tradition of using highly evocative visual media to
reinforce the written message, images of this civilian support is being widely
propagated. (Illustration 48).244 During the months of June, July, and August 2008
this image could be seen all across Beijing in newspapers, magazines, and the central
government's television commercials The picture of a young boy in Sichuan rescued
by the PLA is not, on its own, partially remarkable. What made the picture so well
known was the child's action. Despite his obvious injures and near-death experience
this child times the time and psychical effort and determination to raise one arm to
honor the PLA by saluting the soldiers.
Direct praise for the PLA is not only drawn from stories and images of
local support, but also from the government itself. The PLA, having admirably
followed its central directive, is then often commended by the central government. In
news-channels/photo-reportsI2008-11/09/photo-reports.htm (accessed November 9, 2008).
243 Liu Yunyun 2008, p. 1.
244 Xiezu ~~£l 2008, p. 51.
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the case of large scale emergences, and thus large scale PLA operations, direct praise
for the PLA's actions often comes from the highest branches of government, is highly
publicized and carries images of soldiers directly congratulated. This October 9, 2008
story from Xinhua titled President Hu Praises Army's Role in Quake Reliefcontains
many congratulations to brave individuals, but also the PLA in general, noting that it
was the first in to aid victims. (Illustration 49).245
Following these trends modem observers of the PLA are beginning to
take notice of how powerful a tool the representations of aiding Chinese citizens in
need can be, and how cost-effective the prominence of modem images aggrandizing
PLA disaster relief is in generating PLA support. "In this case [disaster relief] a
relatively small amount of spending can result in a much larger amount of good will
on the part of the people assisted by the PLA disaster relief operations."246 Following
the widespread publicity and praise ofPLA actions, some Western observers feel
opinions are improving regarding the overall worthiness and generalized good
feelings with which average Chinese regard the PLA. "Military participation in these
activities [examples of disaster relief] is considerably improving the PLA's image in
the eyes of average Chinese citizen[s] ."247 While current, popular, grassroots
perceptions of the PLA are difficult to accurately gather or predict, some independent
verification of Western observers is possible. During my June 2008 research in
245 Wang Yan (ed), "President Hu praises army's role in quake relief ," PLA Daily, October 9, 2008
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-l0/09/content_lOI72134.htm (accessed November 9,
2008).
246 Blasko 2006, p. 176.
247 Blasko 2006, p. 175.
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Beijing it immediately became apparent how prominent positive images ofPLA
disaster relief had become in the nation's capital. In interviews with Chinese college
students, security guards and other people around Beijing willing to speak with me
about the PLA, the one universal answer to my questions was a strong degree of
respect and appreciation towards the PLA's efforts to save lives in Sichuan and the
winter 2008 snow storm. No deviations existed on this question. Everyone I spoke
with responded by describing how wonderful it was to see the army do so well and
help so many in need. Another, more radical, example of this widespread perception
of the PLA's domestic prominence in aiding civilians is a curious video that has
become widely circulated among Youtube users. In 2007 the video contained no
English, but a year later comes with the title China Army vs USA Army in Real War.
The video itself is a slide show that portrays image after image of PLA soldiers
working to save the children and the elderly during the 2007 flood. (Illustration
50).248 (Illustration 51).249 What makes this particularly interesting is the juxtaposition
these images received, being portrayed against that of the American military
participation in post-hurricane Katrina relief. The Chinese in the left image
commends the PLA for "Chinese child carried above the flood," while the American
image on the right simply reads "no food, no food, no food." Such a video is by no
means concrete proof regarding the creation of positive images regarding the PLA,
but it does suggest that the central state's message is beginning to find some
248 editor, "China Army vs USA Army in real war," YouTube, August 26,2007,
http://www.youtube.com!watch?v=aD4CWrX9wMY (accessed November 9,2008).
249 editor, "China Army vs USA Army in real war," YouTube, August 26, 2007,
http://www.youtube.com!watch?v=aD4CWrX9wMY (accessed November 9,2008).
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resonance in the general population. In either case, the Chinese government is putting
great efforts into portraying the modem PLA as capable, loyal and pious caretakers
of China.
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
In many ways the history and evolution of the CCP has been inescapably
linked to that of the PLA. This is, when viewed through the lens of traditional
Confucian Chinese society, quite remarkable. Throughout vast portions of Chinese
history the army, and those who would become soldiers, were denigrated and
disrespected. Yet, during the Chinese civil war the Chinese Communist Party
concluded it must, as one other warring faction, raise a military of its own. Thus, on
August 1, 1927 the PLA was officially born.
However, the PLA ultimately became something far different than any
other armed force China had - or has - seen. The PLA's commanders, the founding
members of the CCP, who would ultimately come to power, decided their power
would come from becoming the likable faction; this was accomplished by interacting
with civilians in ways that could enhance the army's prestige and respectability. In
the PLA's early years great care was taken to ensure the soldiers did not harm those
around them, but instead won the hearts and minds of commoners. This began a long
struggle to undo traditional stereotypes held against soldiers. After victory, soldiers
were soon needed to engage the United Nations in Korea, and thus mass recruitment
campaigns began anew. This became the PLA's first test of recruitment when China
itself faced no direct aggression. New tactics were needed, and traditional
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conceptions of loyalty and piety became inverted and tied with prestige. Later,
peacetime saw the PLA at the forefront of massive propaganda campaigns.
Ultimately, the populace grew tired ofmass political movement. A new leadership
eager to set a new course for China, combined with an overactive PLA, culminated in
a zenith in popular imagery and power. Yet, in 1989 when the central leadership
called upon the PLA to clear Tiananrnen Square of protesters, the PLA, eventually,
did exactly as directed. Once again the central leadership valued the direct power of
the PLA. Displays around the world of how weak the PLA had become relative to
other nations' armies soon helped reverse trends in downplaying the importance of
the PLA and began a shift toward modernization. A new kind of PLA began to
evolve based on high-tech weapons. It has since been backed by a booming civilian
economy that can provide weapons and funding. Yet, this new PLA requires a new
kind of soldier, one who is comfortable with higher education and a computer as well
as a rifle. Ironically, the technology that makes modernization of the PLA possible
also strengthens the civilian economy, creating a strong dis-incentive for highly
educated youths to join the army. As a result, the modem Chinese government has
once again embarked on a massive campaign to strengthen the prestige of the PLA in
China.
Thus, the resulting story is, in many ways, truly a 'people's army'. The
PLA has never in its history been able to act independently of society, or the
changing role the central leadership sets for it. This, undoubtedly, is true for any large
organization working within a society, yet for the PLA the relationship is especially
close. Throughout its history the PLA's image has always been key. In the wars for
116
independence the PLA represented the face of the emerging CCP. In the Korean war
the PLA's image became painstakingly crafted to draw in enough recruits. During
the Cultural Revolution the PLA became a mass disseminator of propaganda. Later
years saw a society moving away from mass political campaigns and the PLA,
largely retreated from society. From its founding, until Deng Xiaoping, the PLA
played a role of dominance within society because those leading the nation deemed
the PLA most capable, or most needed, in helping set that direction. Later post-Mao
China saw the goals of the nation radically change, and the PLA changed with it.
China has, however, evolved a great deal from Deng's initial endeavorer
into capitalism. Modem China now sees a booming economy, high technology and a
central leadership that once again values the PLA. Thus, the PLA is once again
returning - in force - to the forefront of Chinese politics and imagery. Yet, as
always, this interaction is directed and controlled by the political, social and economy
realities of the time. Gone are the days when a sturdy peasant with a rifle and millet
could win the day. But, the civilian economy is pulling the new kinds of recruits
needed away from the PLA. This problem is being taken seriously, and strong
measures are being implemented that fit modem China. One such measure is a strong
modem propaganda campaign designed to educate all Chinese on the need for a
strong PLA, how the PLA is becoming strong and why the young and educated
should enlist.
Modem movements to elevate the PLA's image, like those of decades
past, are designed to resonate with the society of the day. Today's China is evolving
with remarkable speed in almost every way imaginable. One such evolution is Bu
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Jintao's October 2006 introduction of a socialist 'harmonious society.' This
movement is still in its infancy, but moves to correct many of the emerging problems
caused by the blistering pace of Chinese reforms, growth and market expansion.
Corruption, inequality, pollution and basic social problems are all being questioned.
"This policy, identified with the Hu Jintao leadership, acknowledges the new
problems that have emerged as China continues its amazing economic growth. The
economy is booming but so are tensions from rising inequality, environmental
damage, health problems, diverse ethnicities, and attempts to break the "iron rice
bowl. ,,250 A 'people first' mentality is being advocated as the path to correcting these
growing problems. The PLA is, as always, a product of its time. And while its wages
can't compete with those of the civilian sector and while a host of problems exist that
might drive away the young and educated, the central government is enacting a
massive contemporary campaign to portray the PLA as exactly the kind, loyal and
pious 'people first' caretaker of this new China. The disasters of 2007 and 2008 have
given the PLA great opportunities to display exactly how they can look after the
entire nation when it needs them the most. Real action, which no doubt saves untold
lives, is being supported by a propaganda campaign that is equally potent. Images,
stories and tales of sacrifice, caring and responsibility by the young men and woman
of the PLA can now be found all over China, from TV to books to popular domestic
movies. These events are unfolding as this narrative unfolded. We know what the
new PLA needs. Modem observers should look for this new army to find itself
250 Matthew Boswell, "Harmonious Society," China Elections and Governance, July 23, 2007,
http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=9752 (accessed November 9,2008).
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through the China of the time, just as it has always done. As further domestic,
political and economy events unfold, the PLA will follow. While the soldiers of
today, dressed in new uniforms and supported by tanks and cutting-edge missiles
look nothing like those who won the civil war, the PLA's basic interaction and quest
for prestige within Chinese society has remained constant.
APPENDIX
ILLUSTRATIONS
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Illustration 1 Bidding a Young Soldier Farewell
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Illustration 2 A Young Soldier Leaving Home
Illustration 3 Advance Courageously along the Great Glorious Road
of Chairman Mao's May 7th Directive, 1971
Illustration 4: The Chinese Liberation Army is the Great School of
Mao Thought (1969)
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Illustration 5 Organize Contingents of the People's Militia, on a Big Scale
Illustration 6 Peking University PLA Recruitment Office
Photo by Jason Ross
Illustration 7 Peking University PLA Recruitment Office Poster
Photo by Jason Ross
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Illustration 8 Pretend Taiwanese Beachhead
Photo by Jason Ross
Illustration 9 Model Aircraft Carrier
Photo by Jason Ross
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Illustration 10 Children Inside Model Aircraft Carrier
Photo by Jason Ross
Illustration 11 Propaganda Posted Inside Model Aircraft Carrier
Photo by Jason Ross
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Illustration 12 Inside Amphibious Landing Vehicle During Mock Invasion of
Photo by Jason Ross Pretend Taiwanese Beachhead
Illustration 13 PLA Soldiers Practicing Amphibious Landing
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Illustration 14 Scoring a Direct Hit
Illustration 15 Physical Training
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US Marines VS Chinese Marines
Illustration 16 United States Marine in Chinese Obstacle Course
Illustration 17 Bookstore near Peking University
Photo by Jason Ross
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Illustration 18 Model of our Time
Photo by Jason Ross
Illustration 19 Model of our Time
Photo by Jason Ross
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Illustration 20: CCTV Broadcast of a PLA Soldier's Biography
Photo by Jason Ross
Illustration 21 CCTV Broadcast of a PLA Soldier's Biography
Photo by Jason Ross
130
Illustration 22 Peking University's PLA Hero in Recruitment Poster
Illustration 23 Peking University's PLA Hero in School Paper
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Illustration 24 Movie Store near Peking University
Photo by Jason Ross
Illustration 25 Captain Gu (center) (the red-scarfed Scholar
behind him (right))
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Illustration 26
Bookstore near Peking University,
August, 2008
Photo by Jason Ross
Illustration 27:
Subway Stop, Third Ring Road
Beijing, July, 2008
Photo by Jason Ross
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Illustration 28: CCTV 7, June, 2008
Photo by Jason Ross
Illustration 29 Photograph of Advertisement in a
Cab,Beijing, June, 2008
Photo by Jason Ross
Illustration 30 Frost-bitten Hands
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Heavy LaborIllustration 31 Transporting Food
Illustration 33 Sleeping Soldiers, Sichuan Earthquake
Illustration 34 Sleeping Soldiers, Winter 2008 Snowstorm
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Illustration 35 Soldiers Pictured in the Mao Era
Illustration 36 Soldiers Pictured in the 2008 Snowstorm
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Illustration 37 1976 Earthquake Poster
Illustration 38 2008 Sichuan Earthquake
Illustration 39 Early PLA Soldier Helping Peasants Harvest Grain
Illustration 40 2008 Sichuan Earthquake, PLA Solders Helping Harvest Grain
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Illustration 41 Pious PLA Soldiers
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Illustration 42 Carrying a Chinese Elder to Safety
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Illustration 43 Caring for Chinese Young
Illustration 45 Winter 2008 Snowstorm Rescue Operations
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Illustration 44 Adoptive Mother
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Illustration 48: Between the months of July and September 2008,
this image was seen all over Beijing,
CCTV and Domestic Olympic Advertisements.
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Illustration 46 Departing Soldiers
Illustration 49 Hu Congratulating Heroic Soldiers
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China Army vs USA Army in real war
Illustration 50 Chinese Child Carried above the Flood
China Army vs USA Army in real war
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Illustration 51 No Food, No Food, No Food
146
REFERENCES
Aifeng, Fan (ed). "Officers and men in test confrontation exercise," PLA Daily,
October 15, 2008, http://english'Pladaily.com.cn/site2/news-channels/2008-
10/15/content_1510539.htm (accessed November 9,2008).
Blasko, Dennis J. The Chinese Army Today (Routledge, 2006).
Blasko, Dennis J. "Chinese Military Logistics: The GAD System Part II", China
Brief, October 14, 2004, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?
volume id=395&issue id=3108&artic1e id=2368693 (accessed November 8,
- - -
2008).
Bickford, J. Thomas. "The Chinese Military and Its Business Operations: The PLA as
Entrepreneur," Asian Survey, Vol. 34, May 1994,
http://wwwjstor.org/stable/2645058 (accessed November 17,2008).
Boswell, Matthew. "Harmonious Society," China Elections and Governance, July
23, 2007, http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=9752 (accessed
November 9, 2008).
Brook, Timothy. Quelling the People (Oxford University Press, 1992).
Chaozhong, Qiu. "Troops help people in quake-hit areas to harvest wheat," PLA
Daily, May 29, 2008, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/special-
reports/2008-05/29/content_1287493.htm (accessed November 9, 2008).
Cheng, Chester J (ed). The Politics ofthe Chinese Red Army (Hoover Institution
Publications, 1966).
Cheng, Chu-yuan. Behind the Tiananmen Massacre (Westview Press, 1990).
Chen, Sijin. "The Challenge of Conscription in an Era of Social Change," in Civil-
military Relations in Today's China,
"China Army vs USA Army in real war," YouTube, August 26,2007,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aD4CWrX9wMY (accessed November 9,
2008).
147
China Steps up to 'one child' policy (BBC, 2000) http://news.bbc.co.ukJ2/hi/asia-
pacific/94l5ll.stm (accessed November 8, 2008).
Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power ofthe People's
Republic ofChina 2007 (Office of the Secretary ofDefense, 2007)
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/070523-China-Military-Power-
final.pdf (accessed November 8, 2008).
Eikenberry, Karl. US.-China Military Relations: Engaging the PLA (Roundtable
Meeting, US-China Roundtable, 1999).
Elman, Benjamin A. A Cultural History ofCivil Examinations in Late Imperial
China (Univeristy of California Press, 2000).
Esherick, Joseph W., Paul Pickowicz and Andrew Walder, eds., Chinese Cultural
Revolution as History (Stanford University Press, 2006).
Fen, Chen (ed). "Hu Highlights Importance of military training in peacetime,"
Xinhua English, June 27,2006 http://news3.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-
06/27/content_4757830.htm (accessed November 9,2008).
Finkelstein, David M. and Kristen Gunness (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharp, 2006).
Finkelstein, David M. and Kristen Gunnes (ed). Civil-military Relations in Today's
China, ( M. E. Sharp, 2006).
Flanagan, Stephen 1. and Michael E. Marti (ed). The People's Liberation Army and
China in Transition (National Defense University Press, 2003).
Griffith II, Samuel B. The Chinese People's Liberation Army (McGraw-Hill book
Company, 1967).
Goldfarb, Michael. "China's New Soldier," The Weekly Standard, September 10,
2007
http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2007/09/chinas_new_soldi
er.asp (accessed November 9,2008).
Gordan, Bennett and Montaperto N. Ronald. Red Guard: The Political Biography of
Gurtov, Mel. "Swords into Market Shares: China's Conversion ofMilitary Industry to
Civilian Production," The China Quarterly, Vol. 134, June 1993,
http://wwwjstor.org/stable/654300 (accessed November 17, 2008).
Dai Hsio-Ai (Doubleday & Company, Inc, 1972).
148
Haibo, Sun. "Witness on Site: Journalists Journey Beyond Role as Recorders," China
Pictorial (2008) p. 28.
Jain, 1. P. After Mao, What? (Westview Press, 1975).
Jiao, Wu. "PLA officer driving force behind snow relief effort," China Daily,
February 19, 2008, http://chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-
02/19/content_6464342.htm (accessed November 9,2008).
Jiang, Yarong and David Ashley. Mao's Children in the New China (Routledge,
2000).
"Jijiehao ~;m5Jn [The Assembly]," Love HK Film, 2007,
http://www.1ovehkfilm.com/panasia/assembly.htm (accessed November 9,
2008).
Jin, Qiu. The Culture ofPower (Stanford University Press, 1999).
Kamphausen, Roy and Andrew Scobell (ed). Right Sizing the PLA (US Government,
2007).
Kamphausen, Roy, Andrew Scobell, Travis Tanner (ed). The "People" in the PLA
(US Government, 2008).
Kau, Ying-mao. The People's Liberation Army and China's Nation-Building
(International Arts and Science Press, 1973).
Lague, David. "China investing heavily to train a more tech-savvy army," New York
Times Herald Tribune, May 29,2007,
http://www.iht.com/artic1es/2007/05/29/asia/china.php (accessed November
8,2008).
Landsberger, Stefan R. "Stefan Landsberger's Chinese Propaganda Poster Pages,"
(International Institute of Social History, 1994),
http://www.iisg.nll~landsberger/index.html (accessed November 8, 2008).
Lee, Hong Yung. The Politics ofthe Chinese Cultural Revolution (University of
California, Berkeley, 1978).
"Lessons from the March Missile crisis," Taiwan Communique No. 71, June 1996,
http://www.taiwandc.org/twcom/7l-n03.htm (accessed November 9, 2008).
149
Liwei, Yang. fU1-=/§;J%, "daiyan zhengbing guanggao 1i; § 1lE~} -15" [Conscription
advocacy ads], bei qing wang ~t.~ [Beijing Youth Daily] November 2,
2007, http://bjyouth.ynet.com/artic1e.jsp?oid=25047042 (accessed November
9,2008).
Lo, Timothy. "PLA Reform," Coping with the Dragon, 2007,
http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/pubs/CopingwithDragon.pdf (accessed
November 8, 2008).
MacFarquhar, Roderick and Michael Schoenhals. Mao's Last Revolution (Harvard
University Press, 2006).
Mamdani, Bashir and Meenal Mamdani. The Impact ofChina's one-child Policy
(Indian Journal of Medical Ethics, 2006),
http://www.issuesinmedicalethics.org/143ss106.html (accessed November 8,
2008).
Meisner, Maurice. Mao's China and After: A History ofthe People's Republic, third
edition (Free Press, 1999).
Nathan, Andrew J. and Perry Link (ed). The Tiananmen Papers (PublicAffairs,
2001).
Nelsen, Harvey W. The Chinese Military System (Thornton Cox Publishers, 1977).
Office of Naval Intelligence, China's Navy 2007 (Office of Naval Intelligence, 2007)
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/oni/chinanavy2007.pdf (accessed November 8,
2008).
Perry, Elizabeth and Li Xun. Proletarian Power: Shanghai in the Cultural Revolution
(Westview, 1997).
Pike, John. "PLA History" (Global Security, 2008)
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/pla-history.htm (accessed
November 8, 2008).
PLA Daily Photo Gallery, various dates, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/news-
channels/photo-reports/2008-11/09/photo-reports.htm (accessed November 9,
2008).
Pocha, Jehangir S. "The Greying of China," The Boston Globe, January 2,2007
http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia!artic1es/2007/01/02/the_graying_oC
china! (accessed November 8, 2008).
150
Postig1ione, Gerard A. Education and Social Change in China: Inequality in a
Market Economy (M. E. Sharp, 2006).
Q&A: China's Military Budget (BBC, 2008) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/10w/asia-pacific/
7277382.stm (accessed November 8,2008).
Ruilin, Mo. "Building up crack toops through hard training," PLA Daily, October 16,
2008, http://eng1ish.p1adai1y.com.cnlsite2/news-channe1s/2008-
10/16/content_1512123.htm (accessed November 9, 2008).
Runping, Yao (ed). "People's Liberation Army starts national recruitment," Xinhua
English, November 1,2006 http://news3.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-
11/01/content_5275743.htm (accessed November 8, 2008).
Saich, Tony. Governance and Politics ofChina (Palgrave, 2001).
Shambaugh, David. Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and
Prospects (University of California Press, 2002).
Shutao, Song (ed). "Jet fighter presented to SW China middle school," Xinhua
English, September 27,2007 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-
09/27/content_6799399.htm (accessed November 9,2008).
Shichor, Yitzhak. "China's Revolution in Higher Education", China Brief, March 2,
2006, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?
volume_id=415&issue_id=3637&artic1e_id=2370828 (accessed November 8,
2008).
Sinay, Yao (ed). "PLA sends 600,000 plus quilts, cotton-padded coats to disaster-hit
areas," Xinhua English, January 30,2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/
2008-01/30/content_7526655.htm (accessed November 9, 2008).
SinoDefence, (SinoDefence.com, 2008) http://www.sinodefence.com/.
Spurr, Russell. Enter th Dragon: China's Undeclared War Against the u.s. In Korea,
1950-51(Newmarket Press, 1988).
Suettinger, Robert L. Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations 1989-
2000 (Brookings Institution Press, 2003).
"Survey: Graduates from famous universities get a head start injobs game," Xinhua
English, November 30, 2007 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-11/30/
content_7175059.htm (accessed November 8,2008).
151
Tsou, Tang. The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms. (The Univeristy of
Chicago Press, 1986).
"US Marines VS Chinese Marines," YouTube, August 20, 2007,
http://www.youtube.comlwatch?v=bFoWCbQiwXw (accessed November 9,
2008).
Wang, Shaoguang. The Military Expenditure ofChina, 1989-1998 (Department of
Political Science, Yale University, 1999)
http://www.cuhk.edu.hkJgpalwang_fi1es/Mi1ex.pdf (accessed November 8,
2008).
Wolf, Charles Jr., K. C. Yeh, Benjamin Zycher, Nicholas Eberstadt, Sungho Lee.
Fault
Lines in China's Economic Terrain (Rand, 2003).
Xiaobing, Li. A History ofthe Modern Chinese Army (The University Press of
Kentucky, 2007).
Xiezu, Bian. ¥~J3.~, Wenchuan! Wenchuan! Jiangzhen Yiju Zhongguo t)() II !t)() II!
~.ffi.~~X: ~ tp 00 [Wenchuan! Wenchuan! Strong Earthquake Casts Doubt on
China] (Foreign Language Press, 2008).
Xuequan, Mu. "PLA to intensify disaster relief efforts," Gov.cn, August 14,2006,
http://english.gov.cnl2006-08/14/content_361421.htm (accessed November 9,
2008).
Xuequan, Mu (ed). "General stresses PLA's mission to safeguard national
sovereignty," Embassy ofthe People's Republic ofChina in Australia, March
6, 2007 http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t301488.htm (accessed
November 9, 2008).
Xuezhong, Li. ~£I~, "ni shi beida zui shiqi de nansheng! {1J\£~t*~yrjJ~~~~
[You are the most handsome guy at Beida] sohu t5il~J1\ http://news.sohu.coml
20070903/n251917680.shtml (accessed November 9, 2008).
Yan, Wang (ed). "President Hu praises army's role in quake relief," PLA Daily,
October 9, 2008 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-
10109/content_10172134.htm (accessed November 9, 2008).
Yunyun, Liu. "The PLA Shoulders the Load," Beijing Review, May 22,2008, http://
www.bjreview.com.cnlquotes/txt/2008-05/23/content_118l54.htm (accessed
November 9,2008).
152
Zhang, Wei-Wei. Ideology and Economic Reform Under Deng Xiaoping 1978-1993
(Kegan Paul International, 1996).
